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NOTES
REFORMULATION OF THE RULE AGAINST INTRODUCING NEW
MATTER IN APPELLATE COURTS-THE HORMEL CASE*
ACCORDING to a long standing rule of appellate procedure, matter not
raised in trial courts will not be considered on appeal.' Justification for this
rule is found in the administrative necessity that there be an efficient, final
disposition of litigation. 2 Despite the rule, however, there have been many
exceptional cases where new matter 3 has been considered on appeal. Addi-
tional matter tending to support affirmance of the trial court's decision 4 as
*Hormel v. Helvering, 61 Sup. Ct. 719 (U. S. 1941).
1. Helvering v. Salvage, 297 U. S. 106 (1936); General Utilities & Operating Co.
v. Helvering, 296 U. S. 200 (1935); Burnet v. Commonwealth Improvement Co.,
287 U. S. 415 (1932); Helvering v. Achelis, 112 F. (2d) 929 (C. C. A. 2d, 1940).
See Duignan v. United States, 274 U. S. 195, 200 (1927). But see Comm'r v. Linder-
man, 84 F. (2d) 727 (C. C. A. 3d, 1936), cert. denied, 299 U. S. 589 (1936) (court
permitted new matter on appeal without any explanation). For an exhaustive discussion
of the rule, see Campbell, Extent to Which Courts of Review Will Consider Questions
Not Properly Raised and Preserved (1932) 7 Wis. L. REv. 91, 160, (1933) 8 Wis. L.
REv. 147.
2. See (1927) 40 HARv. L. REv. 997. Surprise and prejudice to respondent and
deprivation of the assistance of a decision below are other rationales used by the courts
to justify the rule. Helvering v. Wood, 309 U. S. 344, 349 (1940) ; Helvering v. Tex-
Penn Oil Co., 300 U. S. 481, 498 (1937). The writ of error concept and the prohibition
against appellate courts exercising original jurisdiction also support the rule. Krause
v. Snyder, 87 F. (2d) 723 (C. C. A. 8th, 1937). See Helvering v. Taylor, 293 U. S.
507, 512 (1935); Dickinson Tire & Machine Co. v. Dickinson, 29 F. (2d) 493, 495
(C. C. A. 2d, 1928); Note (1940) 50 YALE L. J. 315.
3. The shortcomings of legal terminology are indicated by the various words used
to denote the new "matter" raised on appeal. Mr. Justice Black in his opinion in the
Horinel case used the word "issue" eight times, "question" six times, "point" twice,
"theory" twice, "contention" once, and "interpretation" once; all were used to describe
something brought up for the first time in the appellate court. The connotations of
"the issue" of a case and "a contention" of one of the parties seem to differ a great deal.
Similar differences in meaning exist between the other words. But no adequate method
of defining the various words or the sort of thing for which they stand has yet been
evolved. In the absence of something more concrete the general word "matter" will
be used throughout this Note to include all of these various terms and the meaning
they carry with them.
4. Riley Investment Co. v. Comm'r, 61 Sup. Ct. 95 (U. S. 1940); Helvering v.
Gowran, 302 U. S. 238 (1937), (1938) 51 HARV. L. REv. 1058; Helvering v. Rankin,
295 U. S. 123 (1935) ; accord, Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F. (2d) 809 (C. C. A. 2d, 1934),
aff'd, 293 U. S. 465 (1935); Seufert Bros. Co. v. Lucas, 44 F. (2d) 528 (C. C. A.
9th, 1930) ; cf. Helvering v. Leonard, 310 U. S. 80 (1940) (court permitted introduction
of new matter which justified its decision of reversal) ; see Rhodes v. Comm'r, 111 F.
(2d) 53, 57 (C. C. A. 4th, 1940) (new grounds permitted for affirmance, but not for
reversal). But see Pfeiffer v. Comm'r, 302 U. S. 247, 249 (1937).
well as that relating to the court's jurisdiction5 is accepted by the appellate
court when raised there for the first time. Other recognized exceptions are
supervening decisions on matters raised below," "fundamental errors of law",
and matter demanding immediate determination in the public interest.8 All
these exceptions result from the desire to do justice in specific cases, even
at the expense of prolonging litigation.
The rule that new matter may not be considered on appeal has been
reformed by the Supreme Court's recent decision in Horn -,. Hclvering.
The grantor, Hormel, and his wife were beneficiaries of the short term,
irrevocable trusts involved in this case. Hormel and another were co-trustees,
removable at the will of the beneficiaries. Resting its decision on Sections
166 and 167 of the Revenue Act of 1934, the only parts of the statute there
relied upon by the Government, the Board of Tax Appeals held that the
income from these trusts was not taxable to the grantor.' 0 After the briefs
had been filed in the Circuit Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court decided
in Helvering v. Clifford" that Section 22(a) of the 1934 Act was sufficiently
broad to include many such trusts within its definition of gross income. Dis-
5. Egyptian Novaculite Co. v. Stevenson, 8 F. (2d) 576 (C. C. A. 8th, 1925). The
Statute of Limitations, which is regularly permitted to be raised for the first time on
appeal, is included with this exception. Griffiths v. Comm'r, 50 F. (2d) 782 (C. C. A.
7th, 1931).
6. This applies to state and federal court decisions alike. See Vandenbark v.
Owens-Illinois Glass Co., 61 Sup. Ct. 347 (U. S. 1941), (1940) 50 YALE L J. 315;
Blair v. Comm'r, 300 U. S. 5 (1937); Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. v. Dennis, 224 U. S. 503
(1912); White v. Higgins, 116 F. (2d) 312 (C. C.A. 1st, 1940). In Trapp v. Met.
Life Ins. Co., 70 F. (2d) 976 (C. C. A. 8th, 1934), aff'd on rehearing, 72 F. (2d) 374.
ceit. denied, 293 U. S. 596 (1934) it was held that a section of a statute made applicable
by a recent state court decision should be considered although urged for the first time
on appeal. This was likened to a change in the law regarding an issue already raised.
The Hormel case might well fit into such a pattern.
7. Campbell, op. cit. supra note 1, at 175; Nat'l Fire Ins. Co. of Hartford v.
School District No. 68, 115 F. (2d) 232 (C. C.A. 10th, 1940) (failure of trial court
to regard statute regulating measure of damages considered fundamental error). The
appellate court may send a case back to the trial court for fuller consideration if the
record is not adequate [United States v. Shelby Iron Co., 273 U. S. 571 (192)] or if
legal theories important to the case have not been considered [United States v. Rio
Grande Irrigation Co., 184 U. S. 416 (1902)].
8. First Nat*l Bank of Raton -. 'McBride, 20 N. M6. 381, 399, 149 Pac. 353, 359
(1915) (determination of taxation question considered because of public importance).
For discussion of one phase of the problem of new issues being raised where public
policy demands it-criminal appellate procedure-see Comment (1941) 54 I-Lxn. L
REv. 1204. The conclusion there is that, though courts pay lip-service to the general
rule, they rcally consider the merits of the matter when it is newly raised in criminal
appeals. The Comment suggests that, "The appellate court might better follow the
procedure . . . which e-xpressly enables the appellate courts to review the entire
record and reverse, in their discretion, whenever it is necessary in the interests of
justice."
9. 61 Sup. Ct. 719 (U. S. 1941), 27 VA. L. REv. 826, 27 A. B. A. J. 248.
10. Jay C. Hormel, 39 B.T.A. 244 (1939).
11. 309 U. S. 331 (1940).
19411 NOTES 1461
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
carding Section 166, which was relied on before the Board of Tax Appeals,
the Government based its argument in the appellate court on Section 22(a)
as interpreted in the Clifford case and Section 167 which had been raised
below. It was on the basis of Section 22(a) that the Eighth Circuit Court
of Appeals reversed the decision of the Board.12 After granting certiorari
because of a conflict in circuits, 13 the Supreme Court affirmed the decision
and remanded the case to the Board of Tax Appeals so that any further
facts necessary for a determination of the gross income issue might be found
by that tribunal.
The new matter considered by the appellate court might have been admitted
under one of the recognized exceptions to the general rule. It could be argued
that the question of substantial ownership was actually litigated before the
Board.' 4 At the trial the Commissioner referred to Treasury Regulations
86, Article 166-1 which discussed ownership of trusts.1 5 Thus the case
might fall within the exception made for supervening decisions on matters
raised below. Another possibility would be to regard the new matter as
reason for sustaining a decision, i.e., the Commissioner's original determina-
tion that a deficiency existed.' 0
But rather than compress the Horniel case into hitherto recognized excep-
tions, the Court rested its decision upon the broader ground that appellate
courts should hear new matter "as justice may require."' 17  Mr. Justice
Black said that the matter should have been heard because "the orderly rules
12. Helvering v. Hormel, 111 F. (2d) 1 (C. C. A. 8th, 1940).
13. 61 Sup. Ct. 35 (U. S. 1941). Compare Helvering v. Hormel, 111 F. (2d)
1 (C. C. A. 8th, 1940) with Helvering v. Richter, 114 F. (2d) 452 (C. C. A. 3d, 1940).
14. The circuit court briefs in the Horniel case allotted a major part of the argu-
ment to the question whether the Commissioner, by discussing U. S. Treas. Reg. 86,
Art. 166-1 as amended by T. D. 4629, had raised the issue of substantial ownership
below. See the opinions in Helvering v. Hormel, 111 F. (2d) 1 (C. C. A. 8th, 1940)
and Helvering v. Richter, 114 F. (2d) 452 (C. C. A. 3d, 1940). Comm'r v. Berolz-
heimer, 116 F. (2d) 628 (C. C. A. 2d, 1940) (court cited Section 22(a) as new reason
for sustaining "no-trust" theory). See also Atlantic 'Brewing Co. v. Brennan Grocery
Co., 79 F. (2d) 45 (C. C.A. 8th, 1935) (court examined entire record to determine
whether issue raised by inference).
15. The theory that a trust could be taxed to the grantor if he retained substantial
ownership was not wholly new with the Clifford case. This "no-trust" theory was
suggested by Douglas v. Willcuts, 296 U. S. 1, 9 (1935), (1939) 52 HARv. L. R~v. 804.
U. S. Treas. Reg. 86, Art. 166-1 as amended by T. D. 4629 (1936) shows a tendency
to increase the taxation power over trusts: "But the provisions of Section 166 are not
to be regarded as excluding from taxation to the grantor the income of other trusts,
not specified therein, in which the grantor is, for the purposes of the Act, similarly
regarded as remaining in substance the owner of the corpus .... If the grantor is
regarded as remaining in substance the owner of the corpus the gross income of such
corpus shall be included in the gross income of the grantor, ... "
16. Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F. (2d) 809 (C. C. A. 2d, 1934), aff'd, 293 U. S.
465 (1935) (court utilized new ground to uphold determination of deficiency and
overruled Board's decision). For development of the theory that the Eighth Circuit Court
of Appeals allowed a new issue to be discussed in order to support the Commissioner's
claim of a deficiency, see Note (1940) 25 WASHi. U. L. Q. 616.
17. See Helvering v. Hormel, 61 Sup.'Ct. 719, 721 (U. S. 1941) citing 53 STAT. 164
(1939), 26 U. S. C. § 1141 (c) (1) Supp. 1939.
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of procedure do not require sacrifice of the rules of fundamental justice."18
Under the circumstances of the case, the Court felt that the Government
should be allowed to raise Section 22(a) on appeal in order to avoid in-
justice. By thus stating such a broad, expansive exception to the rule against
raising new matter on appeal, the decision substantially enlarges the powers
of appellate courts. 19
In order to determine the breadth of the decision, it is essential to investi-
gate the limitations which remain and the standards which are set out. Since
the Hormel rule was formulated in a tax case,20 it could be argued that it
is limited to that specific field. Because cases involving the same tax statute
proceed through the legal machinery contemporaneously, the necessity for
equal standards of justice tends to elicit more flexible appellate procedure
in such cases. 2' If all taxpayers are to be treated alike, the accident of posi-
tion on a docket must not be allowed to deprive those litigants already in
the courts of standards set in similar cases. But limitation of the Hor;zel
ruling to tax cases seems unlikely since the opinion is couched in broad terms,
contains no suggestion of any such restriction, and states a policy of justice
which would seem to be universally applicable.
Nor does any distinction between appellate review of district court cases
and of Board of Tax Appeals cases limit the scope of this rule. The powers
of appellate review which circuit courts of appeal exercise over the Board
of Tax Appeals are almost identical to those over district courts. As
established in 1926, the Board was intended to be an administrative tribunal,
but it is actually treated as a court for all practical purposes.2 The Board
has exclusive jurisdiction over deficiency cases while the Court of Claims
and the district courts have jurisdiction over claims for refunds.24 Although
187 Hormel v. Helvering, 61 Sup. Ct. 719, 721 (U. S. 1941).
19. There is some reason to believe that this broad holding was anticipated by
Mr. Justice Douglas in Helvering v. Wood, 309 U. S. 344 (1940) in which he empha-
sized the express waiver of the issue in the circuit court. Some have argued that had
there been no express waiver the issue would have been heard. See Helvering v.
Achelis, 112 F. (2d) 929 (C. C.A. 2d, 1940).
20. For a general discussion of the problems which face the Bureau of Internal
Revenue in collecting taxes as well as the complex legal machinery through which tax
disputes must go, see Traynor, Administrative and Judicial Procedunre for Federal
Income, Estate and Gift Taxes-A Criticism and Proposal (1938) 38 CuL. L. R-y.
1393. See also Traynor and Surrey, Atz, Roads Toward the Settlement of Federal
Income, Estate and Gift Tax Controversies (1940) 7 Lw & Co. aEMw. POnD. 33 .
Emphasis is laid upon the congestion and delay impeding early settlement of tax con-
troversies, postponing decisions on 1934 tax statutes until about 1940.
21. See Reed, J., dissenting in Helvering v. Fuller, 310 U. S. 69, 78 (1940).
-22. 53 STAT. 936, 939 (1939), 28 U. S. C. § 225 Supp. 1939; Legg's Estate v. Comm'r.
114 F. (2d) 760 (C. C. A. 4th, 1940) (arguing that admission of new matter on appeals
from B. T. A. and district courts should be governed by same rules).
23. But see Old Colony Trust Co. v. Comm'r, 279 U. S. 716, 725 (1929) (B. T. A.
said not to be a court).
24. Reuter v. United States, 34 F. Supp. 1014 (Ct. Cl. 1940). Taxpayer's petition
for a refund was refused. In the Court of Claims the original argument was on
Section 166 of the Revenue Act of 1934. However Helvering -,. Clifford ,as subse-
quently decided and the court ruled against the taxpayer on the basis of Section 22(a).
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almost all the tax cases which reach the courts come from the Board of Tax
Appeals, 25 this does not seem to distinguish them from cases which originate
in other courts.26
But there is a functional distinction between the circuit courts of appeals
and the Supreme Court which may serve to differentiate their powers to
hear new matter. The identical new matter considered by the Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals in the Hormel case was sought to be introduced in the
Supreme Court by appellant in Helvering v. Wood,27 but the Court refused
to hear it. The Court in the Hormel case distinguished the Wood case on
the ground that Section 22(a) was expressly waived by the Government
below. 28 From this treatment it might be inferred that the Government
could have raised the new matter in the Supreme Court for the first time
in the absence of an express waiver. Yet such an inference would seem to
be incorrect since the Supreme Court's function is fundamentally different
from that of the circuit courts of appeals. The Supreme Court is the har-
monizer of public law as well as a tribunal for the adjudication of private
controversies. 29 To require this Court to hear new matter which is important
only to the private aspects of the litigation"° would curtail its efficiency in
resolving larger questions of judicial policy. Moreover, by the time the
appellant has reached the Supreme Court, he has had, in addition to the
original trial, the benefit of full appellate review by a circuit court of appeals
where new matter might have been raised.
The effect of the distinctions between the particular courts involved upon
the admissibility of new matter on appeal leads to the question of whether
25. The large body of tax cases coming to the federal courts from the Board makes
this a pressing problem. More tax cases are considered by the federal courts than cases
from all the other administrative bodies combined. In 1937 out of a total of 359 cases
coming to the circuit courts of appeals from all administrative tribunals, 243 cases
came from the B. T. A.
26. See Kotteman v. Comm'r, 81 F. (2d) 621, 623 (C. C. A. 9th, 1936).
27. 309 U. S. 344 (1940).
28. ". . . the Commissioner bases this appeal solely on the question whether or
not such income is taxable under Section 166 of the 1934 Act." Brief for appellant,
p. 5. Comm'r v. Wood, 104 F. (2d) 1013 (C. C. A. 2d, 1939). This test of "express
waiver" has been used as a means of severely limiting the effect of the Wood case.
See Chase Nat'l Bank v. United States, 116 F. (2d) 625 (C. C. A. 2d, 1940).
29. Letter from Chief Justice Hughes to Senator Wheeler, SEN. REP. No. 711,
75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1937) 38, 39. This attitude is stressed in the fourth point of
the Chief Justice's letter in order to explain why the Supreme Court's docket was not
overcrowded and also as an argument against increasing the membership of the Court,
For an indication of a similar viewpoint, see letter from Solicitor General Reed to
Senator Ashhurst, Hearings before Judiciary Committee on S. 1392, 75th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1937) 1869.
30. It is suggested that the Wood case must be regarded in its chronological con-
text. It was decided on the same day as the Clifford case. The vital principle of tax
law had been enunciated in the latter case, and there was no need, as far as public
law was concerned, to discuss Section 22(a) in the Wood opinion. The "express
waiver" theory was probably used because it was the most readily available reason to
explain the refusal to hear the new matter.
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the Hormel case will be applied to judicial review of administrative orders.
If, in such cases, circuit courts of appeals may hear new matter where
justice requires,31 they will exercise a larger degree of control over govern-
mental boards. And the introduction of new matter on appeal will impede
efficient administrative activity to some extent.3 2 The finality of adminis-
trative proceedings would be decreased because appellate courts, by admit-
ting new matter, would often either reverse the Board order forthwith or
remand the case for its further consideration. Since the raison d'Ntre of the
administrative process is to secure prior determination by a body of experts,
the argument for refusing to hear new matter in this field is stronger than
in more traditional legal proceedings. judicial review of the orders of the
FTC, for example, is limited to questions of the Commission's authority and
whether its findings are supported by substantial evidence; specific provision
is made for matter not urged before the Commission.3 But extension of
the Hormel ruling to this field might stultify the administrative process by
causing constant reconsiderations by both court and board.34
The problem of the disposal of the case by the appellate court after it
has heard new matter is strikingly illustrated in judicial review of admin-
istrative proceedings. But the same problem permeates this whole aspect
of appellate procedure. If appellate courts could make final dispositions of
cases, the fear of prolonging litigation would disappear as a reason for not
admitting new matter. In cases involving determinations of fact, remand
would still be necessary because only the trial tribunal could make such
findings.35 But courts have never found a satisfactory method for distinguish-
ing questions of fact from those of law.30 Although the Hormec case was
31. See notes 17 and 22 mpra; note 33 infra.
32. To cite one specific example, the Hormed rule would destroy Professor Traynor's
plan to reorganize the administration of the internal revenue laws. (See Traynor,
op. cit. supra note 20). He suggests that more tax cases would be settled during admin-
istrative negotiations in the Bureau if the Commissioner and taxpayer were forced tn
expose their complete cases at that stage by the device of prohibiting consideration in
the Board of matters not raised below. The purpose of the plan would be lost if the
litigants were permitted, as under the Hormel case, to introduce new matter in the
circuit courts of appeals.
33. Section 5 of the FTC Act specifically provides that when the court considers
the new matter to be material and when there are reasonable grounds for failure to
adduce it below, the court may order such additional evidence to be taken before the
Commission. 43 STAT. 937. (1925), 15 U.S.C. §45 (1934).
34. Such a consequence would not seem to deter the proponents of the Walter-
Logan Bill who would sacrifice administrative competence to achieve more judicial
review.. But adherents of the Attorney-General's Committee on Administrative Pro-
cedure, emphasizing efficient Board operation rather than time-consuming judicial review,
stress the aim of speedy termination of the litigation.
35. See Helvering v. Rankin, 295 U. S. 123, 131 (1935).
36. In Forged Steel Wheel Co. v. LeWellyn, 251 U. S. 511 (1920) the Supreme
Court affirmed the Circuit Court of Appeals' reversal of a judgment against the Com-
missioner without remand for a new trial. It said that only a proposition of law was
involved. See also City and County of Denver v. Union Water Co., 246 U. S. 178
(1918) ; but see Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U. S. 331 (1940) which intimates that the
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remanded by the Supreme Court for further evidence and the Court indi-
cated that a remand order would be the usual procedure in such cases,8 7
such remand will ordinarily amount to a final disposal of the case. Settle-
ments will generally be made except in cases where additional, controlling
evidence is available.
The rule of General Utilities & Operating Co. v. Helverng88 that circuit
courts of appeal should hear only matters raised below"0 has been overturned
by the Hormel case. The new principle vests broad discretion in appellate
courts to decide what new matter should be heard when presented to them
for the first time. Although it would be preferable to have a precise rule
for each different situation, the variegated nature of the matter that m Ay be
presented and the multiple contexts in which it may arise render such an
exact standard impossible. 40 The ultimate wisdom of the Hormel decision
thus depends, in large measure, upon the manner in which the courts exercise
their discretionary power to shape the rules of procedure so that they may
best promote the ends of justice.
Neither the view of the Wood case where an express waiver was conjured
up, nor that taken in those cases where the record was tortured to reveal
an implied waiver promises to secure substantial justice. A more hopeful
prospect would exist if appellate courts were to determine the admissibility
of new matter in the light of the following factors. The fact that the new
matter was not available below and was accordingly not withheld for strategic
reasons would favor admitting it when it was discovered. But where the
new matter would cause unusual hardship, as where rebuttal evidence was
no longer available for example, there would be ground for exclusion. It
would be similarly inadmissible where there would be a possibility of reopen-
ing in the trial tribunal. By taking such factors into account in exercising
their discretion in specific cases, courts may be expected to utilize the Horoel
rule to reach equitable results.
matter of substantial ownership in a trust is a question of fact. Cf. White v. Higgins,
116 F. (2d) 312 (C. C. A. 1st, 1940) (such a question is a mixture of law and fact) ;
Helvering v. Tex-Penn Oil Co., 300 U. S. 481 (1937) (B.T.A.'s findings are mixed
law and fact, and therefore reviewable).
37. This view was also taken in Helvering v. Gowran, 302 U. S. 238 (1937) where
introduction of a new theory was permitted in order to sustain a decision. It has been
suggested that new matters which require additional findings of fact should not be
considered. Note (1941) 54 HARv. L. REv. 689. But the introduction of new matter
almost inevitably creates the possibility, however slight, that'new evidence might have
been introduced before the trial court had that matter been argued there. Where courts
raise new matter on their own motions it would be advisable to remand so that testimony
might be taken before any decision.
38. 29 B. T. A. 934 (1934), rev'd, 74 F. (2d) 972 (C. C. A. 4th, 1935), ree.d, 296
U. S. 200 (1935).
39. So interpreted in Helvering v. Salvage, 297 U. S. 106 (1936).
40. Although the court hints that the Horinel rule will only apply to "exceptional
cases," such a vague standard is scarcely better than none at all. See Virginia-Lincoln
Furniture Corp. v. Comm'r, 56 F. (2d) 1028, 1033 (C. C. A. 4th, 1932); ef. Blair v.
Oesterlein Machine Co., 275 U. S. 220, 225 (1927); Duignan v. United States, 274
U. S. 195, 200 (1927). But see Falstaff Brewing Corp..v, Iowa Fruit & Produce Co.,
112 F. (2d) 101, 106 (C. C.A. 8th, 1940).
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DISCRETIONARY INCOME AND PRINCIPAL CLAUSES IN
TRUST INSTRUMENTS*
DISCRETIONARY clauses in trust instruments, empowering trustees to deter-
mine whether receipts of a trust are income or principal, are a modem device
which may achieve a flexible solution of the complexities in the allocation of
trust receipts.1 Two other methods are commonly used to resolve the con-
flicting claims of the life tenant and remainderman. By remaining silent as
to the meaning of the terms "income" and "principal," a settlor can invoke
the local rules of construction. Or the settlor may attempt to anticipate the
types of receipts and specify in the instrument which shall be income and
which principal. Both these methods are inflexible and in the event of altered
conditions may defeat the purposes of the trust. Confronted with these alter-
natives, many settlors prefer the discretionary clause as a means of achieving
certain purposes: to avoid litigation when the law is not settled; to avoid
complexity or injustice when the law is settled; and to allow the favoring
of either the life tenant or remainderman. In construing such discretionary
clauses, a primary concern of the courts has been whether or not the settlor
intended to empower the trustees to override established local rules of
construction.
This was the problem before the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia in a recent case2 involving a clause which instructed three trustees
"to decide finally any question that may arise as to what constitutes income
and what principal - it being my wish, however, that whenever feasible
their decision be in favor of the life-beneficiaries 3 named herein.. "
* American. Security and Trust Co. v. Frost, 117 F. (2d) 23 (App. D. C. 1940),
cert. denied, 61 Sup. Ct. 829 (U. S. 1941).
1. See generally 2 ScoTT, TRUTsS (3d ed. 1939) §§ 232-237; 4 Bc 'r, TRusTs ,%::
TRUsTEF-s (3d ed. 1935) §§ 841-853; 1 REsTATmET, TRUSTS (1935) §§ 232-240; 12
FLErCHER, CYcLOPniA CORPORATIONS (1931) §§ 5389-5413; Li.nNa, Tns's I-Lx.m-
BooK (Shattuck's Revision, 1940) pp. 174-217. For an analysis of the English rules of
allocation, see STRACHAN, LAW OF TavsT Accou.NTs (1937). The most difficult aspect
of the allocation problem arises from the disbursement of receipts from shares of stork.
See Reeves, Apportionment: A Plea for a Uniform Rule (1940) 14 TM-. L. Q. 195;
Brigham, Pennsylvania Rules Governing the Allocation of Receipts Dc,,cd by Trustees
from Shares of Stock (1937) 85 U. OF PA. L. REv. 358; 130 A. L. R. 492 (1941). For
an attempt to escape from allocation problems, see Carpenter, A Modcrniced Trust Plan
(1937) 64 TRusT CO. MAG. 421.
2. American Security and Trust Co. v. Frost, 117 F. (2d) 23 (App. D. C. 1940).
3. The testatrix indicated that the income of a residuary trust, after specific annui-
ties, was to be divided among two daughters and three grandchildren until twenty-one
years from the death of the survivor of these beneficiaries. At that time the remainder
was to go to any direct issue of the grandchildren, but in the absence of issue the trust
was to be divided among three institutions, the First Church of Christ Scientist of Bos-
ton, Mass., the7 National Red Cross and Iowa Wesleyan College. When the %%ill was
executed the possibility of the grandchildren having direct heirs vas extremely remote.
The two daughters were 67 and 63 years of age; one grandson was 35 years old and had
been married for ten years Without issue; the other grandsun was 43 years old and had
been married 20 years without issue; and the unmarried granddaughter Was 40 years
of age. Transcript of Record before the Court of Appeals, pp. (&."9.
4. Transcript of Record before the Court of Appeals, p. 15.
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Faced with a settled local rule that stock dividends5 belong to corpus and
no rule in regard to administration income G the trustees could not agree
upon the scope of their power and petitioned the District Court for clarifi-
cation.7 The lower court decided that the intent of the testatrix to overrule
the local law was sufficiently clear. But the Court of Appeals reversed. The
majority, seizing upon the ambiguity of the words "question" and "feasible,"
held that the trustees' discretion under the clause could not be exercised
because the law of the jurisdiction was settled 8 and thus no "question" had
arisen.9 The dissenting judge noted that other sections of the will conferred
broad discretionary powers upon the trustees and decided that the sur-
rounding circumstances and purposes of the testatrix indicated that the
principal and income discretion was not limited to doubtful situations.1"
A reading of the dissenting opinion suggests that construction of such clauses
in light of the three purposes for which they may be used might provide an
effective means of determining and resurrecting the settlor's intent when it
is ambiguously expressed.
In the first place, the settlor may seek to simplify trust administration and
avoid litigation when the law of the jurisdiction is not settled. Thus the
discretionary power is intended to relieve the trustees of the necessity of
petitioning for court instructions in doubtful situations." At the most such
5. The stock dividends consisted of 500 shares of bank stock received by the estate.
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia had long followed the Massachusetts
dividend rule, which awards all stock dividends to corpus. Gibbons v. Mahon, 136 U. S.
549 (1890); Lanston v. Lanston, 290 Fed. 315 (App. D. C. 1923).
6. On June 13, 1938, three months after the bill of instructions in the instant case
was filed, this problem of allocation was ruled upon by the Court of Appeals in Proctor
v. American Security and Trust Co., 98 F. (2d) 599 (App. D. C. 1938). The Court
adopted the prevailing rule which awards administration income to corpus. The con-
trolling effect of this decision was made an issue in the principal case by an amendment
to the answer of the corporate trustee.
7. The two individual trustees decided that the two receipts were properly dis-
tributable under the discretionary clause to the life tenants. The corporate trustee dis-
agreed, and, declining to join in the petition for instructions, was named a defendant to
the action.
8. The decision in Proctor v. American Security and Trust Co., 98 F. (2d) 599
(App. D. C. 1938) (see note 6 supra) was deemed by the court to control the allocation
of the administration income.
9. The majority offered an alternative argument that even if the law had been un-
settled the trustees' discretion could not be exercised in the principal case as the law re-
quires unanimous action. See note 34 infra.
10. "In the midst of them (broad powers) the clause in question appears. It is in
strange company, if unlike them in scope. It marches as a pygmy among giants or as
an equal with them. In my judgment, it is with comrades." Dissent of Rutledge, J.,
American Security and Trust Co. v. Frost, 117 F. (2d) 283, 287 (App. D. C. 1940).
11. A trustee may be personally liable for improper allocation even though he acts
in good faith. Owings v. Rhodes, 65 Md. 408, 9 At1. 903 (1886); LoRING, op. cit. supra
note 1, at 174. Despite the lack of recent decisions it seems certain that a trustee may
recoup. Arnold v. Mower, 49 Me. 561 (1861) ; Ellis v. Kelsey, 241 N. Y. 374, 383, 150
N. E. 148, 150 (1925).
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a purpose authorizes only limited discretion, and the power may be further
narrowed in the hands of a cautious trustee by the difficulty of determining
when the law is sufficiently unsettled. In view of the traditionzi reluctance
of trustees to act without court instructions when the scope of their authority
is not clearly etched, the discretionary clause may not be effective when used
for this purpose.
Secondly, the settlor may utilize such a discretionary clause because the
rule enthroned by local courts is difficult to administer. An example is
the Pennsylvania extraordinary dividend rule,'- which apportions receipts
between life tenant and remainderman depending upon the earning period
and the effect upon the intact value of the stock. The determination of
these two items, intact value and period of earnings, may necessitate tracing
receipts through involved corporate accounts, for courts warn that "aver-
aging is not allowable when definite figures can be obtained."' 3 So complex
is this apportionment technique that settlors may wish to avoid its opera-
tion, especially when the estate is small.14 While distributing receipts from
shares of stock represents the most controversial phase of the income and
principal problem, similar difficulties arise in allocating receipts from bonds
bought at a premium or discount,'3 receipts from wasting assets or unpro-
12. The rule of apportionment was first announced in Earp's Appeal, 23 Pa. 36S
(1857). Its aim is "to give to the life tenant the income which has been earned since the
trust came into being, but, at the same time, to preserve the value of the corpus as it
was at the date of the death of the testator, or, . . . to preserve the intact value of the
estate." Nirdlinger's Estate, 290 Pa. 457, 464, 139 Ad. 200, 203 (1927). See Note (1941)
39 MicH. L. Rav. 1253. See Waterhouse's Estate, 303 Pa. 422, 427, 162 Ad. 295, 295
(1932) ; Baird's Estate, 299 Pa. 39, 42, 148 Adt. 907, 908 (1930). For an attempt to
simplify administration of the rule by use of algebraic formulae, see Evans, Calculating
the Dishibution of a Stock Divdcnd Between Life Tenant and Corpus (1929) 77 U. or
PA. L. R-v. 981. The rule of apportionment has been substantially adopted in twelve
states and Hawaii. In New York the rule has been modified by statute so that all stozk
dividends go to corpus. L. 1926, ch. 2843, amending N. Y. PERs. Pm-P. L,%w § 17a; 4
BOGERT, op. cit. supra note 1, at § 849. The Committee on the Restatement of Trusts
adopted the Pennsylvania rule contrary to the expectation of Professor Austin W. Scott,
Reporter. Scott, Modern Problcms in the Law of Trusts, Lecture at Sunbury, Pa., Sept.
27, 1940; 1 RESTATEiErr, TRUST (1935) §§ 232-240.
13. Jones v. Integrity Trust Co., 292 Pa. 149, 152, 140 Ad. 862, 863 (1928).
14. There is no difficulty of administration when the jurisdiction is committed to
the Massachusetts rule, which grants all cash dividends, however large, to income and
all stock dividends to corpus. Minot v. Paine, 99 Mass. 100 (1868). This rule was in-
corporated into the Uniform Principal and Income Act, § 5, which has been adopted by
nine states. 9 UmIrosm LAWS AN.N-or. (Supp. 1940) p. 278.
15. Some courts hold that a trustee who purchases bonds at a premium must amor-
tize so as to protect the corpus. Estate of Gartenlaub, 185 Cal. 648, 19S Pac. 209 (1921) ;
but see 1 RrsTAT.mENr, TausTs (1935) § 239, comment (f). When the trustee retains
securities purchased at a premium by the testator generally no apportionment need b-
made. Connecticut Trust Company's Appeal, SO Conn. 540, 69 At. 360 (1903). On the
other hand the life tenant is not entitled to any portion of bonds purchased at a discount.
Re Gartenlaub, 198 Cal. 204, 244 Pac. 348 (1926). Uxironmi PnaxcwAL A:.D I.co
Acr, § 6.
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ductive property,16 liquidation receipts and proceeds from the sale of trust
property.17
Thirdly, the settlor may desire the share of the life tenant or remainder-
man to be increased whenever possible without endangering either the income
or the stability of the trust. Usually the life beneficiaries are members of
the settlor's immediate family, while the remainderman is relatively remote.
A few courts, recognizing this fact, have developed presumptions in favor
of the life tenants in certain allocation problems.' s Testators who wish to
avoid local rules for this reason may do so by specifically indicating their
intent or by delegating full discretion to the trustees with a mandate to
favor certain parties. A specific direction that "stock dividends shall be
income" will be respected by the courts,' 9 but stock splits may diminish
the corpus beyond what the settlor intended. Similarly, a direction that
"stock diVidends shall be principal" might seriously deplete the income of
the life tenants since such dividends may be frequently distributed by cor-
porations during expansion periods 2 or for tax avoidance purposes.2 ' It is
difficult for the settlor when stating his intention to anticipate future contin-
gencies. Thus shrinkages in property values or security returns and shifts
in corporate policies may defeat the purpose of the trust. The flexibility of
the discretionary device allows a readjustment of distributions to conform
more nearly to the objectives of the settlor.
The result in the principal case turned upon the court's determination of
the purposes which caused the testatrix to utilize the discretionary clause.
The "feasibility" mandate indicates that she desired to favor the life bene-
16. Estate of Knox, 328 Pa. 177, 195 Atl. 28 (1937), (1938) 4 U. oF PITT. L. Rnv.
228. 12 FLErCHER, op. cit. supra note 1, § 5411. Comment (1936) 49 HAnv. L. REV. 805.
17. 2 Scorr, op. cit. supra note 1, § 236.10, 236.12.
18. Chauncey's Estate, 303 Pa. 441, 446, 154 Atl. 814, 815 (1931) (extraordinary
stock dividends).
19. In re Mart's Will, 139 Misc. 558, 248 N. Y. Supp. 789 (Surr. Ct. 1931) ; sec
Estate of Dittmer, 197 Wis. 304, 308, 222 N. W. 323, 324 (1928). Pennsylvania courts
put the burden of proof upon the claimant to establish that the testator intended to escape
local rules. Waterman's Estate, 279 Pa. 491, 495, 124 Atl. 166, 167 (1924). The invasion
of corpus device and the "care, comfort and support" clause are the commonest tech-
niques employed to obtain flexibility so that payments to the life tenants may be increased
when trust income drops or when the needs of the beneficiaries increase.
20. In 1922 corporations issued 3,348,050 shares of their own stock as dividends; in
1927, 702,501; in 1929, 1,228,643; in 1936, 344,972. STATISTICS ON INCOME Fr 1937, Part
2, (U. S. Bur. of Int. Rev. 1938) p. 18. Some writers attribute the size of the 1922 fig-
ure to the decision in Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U. S. 189 (1920). Note (1922) 46 HARV.
L. REv. 298, 299, n. 5. The fairest conclusion would seem to be that corporations utilize
the stock dividend device during and after expansion periods to capitalize earnings. Thus,
the current war economy may cause an increase in the use of stock dividends.
21. Writers were uncertain whether or not the issuance of stock dividends would
allow a corporation a dividends-paid credit under the undistributed profits surtax of the
Income Tax Act of 1936, 49 STAT. 1655 (1936), amended, 50 STAT. 817 (1937), 26 U.
S. C. § 13a (Supp. 1938). Notes (1937) 4 U. OF CHI. L. RLy. 311, (1936) 45 YALE L. J.
1122; Schulman, Undistributed Profits Tax Avoidance after the Koshland Case (1936),
14 TAx MAG. 703.
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ficiaries. The fact that the rules of the jurisdiction were not settled when
the will was executed 22 might imply an intent to avoid litigation. It is
possible, as the majority in the Court of Appeals concluded, that the settlor
intended the "favoring" purpose to operate only within the limits of the
"avoidance of litigation" purpose. This position does not seem persuasive
when considered in light of the circumstances of the will.P While technically
justifiable, the court's adoption of the "avoidance of litigation" purpose neces-
sitates deteniining when there is a "question." The practical difficulty of
this determination and the reluctance of trustees to attempt it, in effect,
may defeat the very purpose which the court attempted to recognize. The
use of the words "question" and "feasible" without more was unfortunate,
and the rest of the will gave the court little help in solving the ambiguity.
Discretionary income and principal clauses have been construed by the
courts in only a few instances and in those cases the results have not been
uniform.2 In the leading case of Duinabiw v. Dunaine25 the clause under
discussion stated: "The trustee under this instrument shall have full power and
discretion to determine whether or not any money or other property received is
principal or income without being answerable to any person for the manner in
which he shall exercise that discretion." The fact that the trustee was also one
of the life beneficiaries and the fact that the local rules of allocation were both
well settled and easy to administer seems to indicate that the settlor's sole pur-
pose in using this clause was to allow favoring of the life beneficiaries. Reading
the instrument as a whole, the court recognized tis purpose and held that
the trustee had the power to ignore local rules and regard profit from the
sale of stock as income. The narrow and more literal approach is typified
by the holding of In Re Tolbot,2 0 the case upon which the majority in the
22. See note 6 supra.
23. It was improbable that the life beneficiaries would have direct heirs and the
interest of the testatrix in the contingent remaindermen was relatively remote, note 3,
supra. This fact and the arbitrary nature of the local rules of allocation points to an
intention to escape the local rules entirely to allow the income of the life tenants to be
increased as much as possible.
24. Broad construction of a broad discretionary clause: Dumaine Y. Dumaine, 301
Mass. 214, 16 N. E. (2d) 625 (1938); Mayberry v. Carey, 268 Mass. 255, 167 X. E.
281 (1929); In re Wells Estate, 156 Wis. 294, 144 N. W. 174 (1913) (final discretion
in executing testator's directions) ; see Greenough v. Comm'r, 74 F. (2d) 25 (C. C. A.
1st, 1934) (tax case). Broad construction of a narrowly worded clause: Chase Nat.
Bank v. Chicago Title and Trusb Co., 155 Misc. 61, 82, 279 N. Y. Supp. 327, 350 (Sup.
Ct. 1935), aff'd, 246 App. Div. 201, 206, 284 N. Y. Supp. 472, 477 (1st Dep't 1935), aff'd,
271 N. Y. 602, 3 N. E. (2d) 205 (1936). Narrow construction of a broadly worded
clause: In re Talbot, 170 Misc. 138, 9 N. Y. S. (2d) 806 (Surr. Ct. 1939) ; but see
Colt v. Duggan, 25 F. Supp. 268 (S. D. N. Y. 1938) (construction of same clause for
tax deduction purposes). See In re Matthew's Will, 255 App. Div. 80, 84, 5 N.Y. S.
(2d) 707, 712 (2d Dep't 1938).
25. 301 Mass. 214, 16 N. E. (2d) 625 (1938), 25 V.%. L. REv. 242.
26. 170 Misc. 138, 9 N. Y. S. (2d) 806 (Surr. Ct. 1939), 52 Hmv. L. REv. 1369;
Contra: Colt v. Duggan, 25 F. Supp. 268 (S. D. N. Y. 1938) (same will construed for
tax deduction purposes). In view of this case one writer suggested an amendment to the
Uniform Principal and Income Act, § 2. "To avoid the tendency toward practical nulli-
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principal case relied. The clause stated: "I authorize my Trustees to deter-
mine whether any moneys, stocks or securities received by them are to be
considered as capital or income (except that stock dividends are to be
treated as income) . . ." The testator designated certain amounts of in-
come from a residuary trust to be paid to operate a poor children's farm.
Shrinkage of income threatened the existence of the charity, but the court
held that the trustee did not have the power to override local rules and pay
administration income to the life tenant.27
Behind narrow construction of these clauses may lurk an inarticulate
judicial policy against broad grants of discretion to the trustees. 28 Such a
policy has not, however, prevailed in the investment of trust funds and
support of beneficiaries, where broad discretionary powers have been judi-
cially upheld. 20  Not only are principal and income clauses similarly vital
to the settlor's purposes, but they relieve the work of both courts and admin-
istrators. 30 The courts retain a measure of control because the exercise of the
discretion is that of a fiduciary, within the limits of good faith,31 proper
motives,32 and reasonable judgment in effecting the purposes of the settlor83
Against demonstrable misuse of the trustees' power, equitable principles
afford a ready remedy.
Discretionary income and principal clauses, whether construed narrowly
or broadly, raise certain perplexities of interpretation. The solution of
fication of a similar provision exhibited in a recent lower court decision in New York,
it might be desirable to adopt the rule of Donaine v. Duinaine and provide that the des-
ignated person's determination shall be conclusive in the absence of bad faith or arbi-
trary action." Nossaman, The Uniform Principal and Income Act (1939) 28 CALIF. L.
REv. 34, 36.
27. In ascertaining the intention of the testator the court paraphrased the discre-
tionary clause by the use of dictionary definitions rather than examining the will as a
whole.
28. It is clear that courts will strike down clauses which attempt to remove com-
pletely the trustee from the control of the courts. Keating v. Keating, 182 Iowa 1056,
165 N. W. 74 (1917). 2 PERRY, TRUSTS (7th ed. 1929) § 511 (a).
29. Discretionary clauses for investment purposes are well recognized. Baer v. Kahn,
131 Md. 17, 101 Atl. 596 (1917). For the effect of legal list statutes upon such discre-
tion, see Comment (1940) 49 YALE L. J. 891, 896. "Care, comfort and support" discre-
tionary clauses are widely used. Note (1934) 20 ST. Louis L. Rtv. 62. See generally,
STEPHENSox, DISCRETIONARY POWERS OF TRUSTEES UNDER WILLS AND TRUST AGREE-
MENTS (1937).
30. Courts will not interfere with discretionary powers in the absence of abuse. Xim-
ball v. Blanchard, 101 Me. 383, 64 Atl. 645 (1906) ; Martin v. McCune, 318 Ill. 585, 149
N. E. 489 (1925); 2 ScoTT, op. cit. supra note 1, § 233.5. But see Taylor v. McClave,
128 N. J. Eq. 109, 15 A. (2d) 213 (Ch. 1940), (1941) 41 CoL. L. R.v. 761.
31. See In re Wells Estate, 156 Wis. 294, 144 N. W. 174 (1913).
32. Kimball v. Blanchard, 101 Me. 383, 390, 64 At. 645, 648 (1906).
33. Loftin v. Kenan, 155 Misc. 552, 280 N. Y. Supp. 28 (Sup. Ct. 1935), (1936) 49
HALv. L. Rzv. 495; In re Van Decar, 49 Misc. 39, 42, 98 N. Y. Supp. 309, 310 (Surr. Ct.
1905) ; In re Trusteeship of Cool, 210 Iowa 30, 34, 230 N. W. 353, 355 (1930) ; Corkery
v. Dorsey, 223 Mass. 97, 111 N. E. 795 (1916); Rinker's Adm'r v. Simpson, 159 Va.
612, 620, 166 S. E. 546, 549 (1932).
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these problems will vary depending upon which of the three purposes the
court attributes to the settlor's action. For instance, the settlor's purpose
would be important in determining whether a trustee could be inconsistent
in his determinations of income and principal. Also under a limited con-
struction, it may be difficult to determine when a sufficient "question" arises
to allow the exercise of the discretion. Possible instances include occasions
when there is no local decision on the point, when there is a conflict of
local decisions and when a factual variation from a settled matter emerges.
On the other hand, a broad construction involves other problems. In some
family situations a broad discretion might subject an individual trustee to
intense pressure from the various beneficiaries. The difficulties inherent in
the exercise of broad discretionary powers may be enhanced by the tradi-
tional requirement of unanimity of action by the trustees.34
It seems clear that discretionary clauses should be interpreted in the light
of the axiom that the intention of the settlor is controlling unless contrary
to public policy s 5 Judicial rules of construction, mechanical by definition,
are designed to operate only in the absence of an expressed intent.30 Con-
fronted with discretionary income and principal clauses, courts should at-
tempt to determine the purpose of the clause in light of the instrument as
a whole and surrounding circumstances, and to resolve ambiguities with
the aim of preserving the settlor's purposes. The holding in the instant case
suggests that future draftsmen contemplating broad discretion should employ
the phrase, "notwithstanding local rules of construction." In addition, a
statement of the specific purposes which the clause was designed to achieve
will guide trustees in the proper exercise of their discretion and will provide
a basis for judicial control.
34. Winslow v. Baltimore and Ohio R. R., 188 U. S. 646, 655 (1903). Dingman
v. Boyle, 285 Ill. 144, 120 N. E. 487 (1918) ; 1 RFSTATEmS2!Er, TRusrs (1935) § 194. An
additional phrase allowing a majority exercise of the power would relieve the problem
and be consistent with more modem trust theory. The Uniform Trusts Act, § 11, adopted
the rule of majority exercise of powers vested in three or more trustees. This Act has
been adopted in two states, Louisiana and North Carolina. 9 U.xromm LAws ANNor.
(Supp. 1940) p. 327. The majority rule has also been adopted by statute in Georgia,
Illinois, and New Hampshire and in Hawaii for purposes of voting stock. 3 Bocr.Er, op.
cit. mipra note 1, § 554.
35. Statutes prohibiting accumulations must be considered in drafting such a dis-
cretionary clause. Equitable Trust Co. v. Prentice, 250 N. Y. 1, 164 N. - 723 (1928)
held that a provision allowing a trustee to allocate stock dividends to corpus did not
violate the New York statute against accumulations. Also a prior statute, although not
applicable to that case, had been passed by the legislature to allow such action. L 1922,
ch. 452 amending PEs. PRoP. LAw § 10. it re Estate of Mars, 301 Pa. 20, 151 Ad. 577
(1930) held that a specific direction that all stock dividends be added to principal was
void under the Pennsylvania statute. The New York statute, PEns. Pnop. L.w § 16,
is aimed at directions for the unlawful accumulations of income and it could be argued
that the discretionary clause involves no such direction to accumulate but rather a grant
of discretion to operate periodically and not always consistently. See In re Dreicer's
Estate, 155 Misc. 817, 280 N. Y. Supp. 535 (Surr. Ct. 1934).
36. In re M[art's Estate, 139 Misc. 558, 248 N. Y. Supp. 789 (Surr. Ct. 1931); Gray
v. Hemenway, 268 Mass. 515, 168 N. E. 102 (1929).
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VACATING STIPULATIONS OF DISCONTINUANCE IN STOCK-
HOLDERS' DERIVATIVE SUITS IN NEW YORK*
UNLIIKE the Federal rule regarding derivative suits, which requires court
approval before discontinuance,' the New York rule has been believed to
give the plaintiff such complete dominion over the suit that he may make a
private settlement with the defendant, discontinue the action and retain the
settlement consideration. 2 Plaintiff's absolute control of the suit under the
New York rule may be divested by intervention of other stockholders,8 but
it is unlikely that knowledge, the practical requisite for such intervention,
would be circulated in a case where a self-seeking plaintiff contemplated a'
secret settlement.
From the viewpoint of the corporation, 4 the power of the plaintiff to dis-
continue a suit once begun is coupled with a statute of limitations", which
may prevent institution of a new suit upon subsequent discovery of the
cause of action.0 The court's opinion in the case of Manufacturers Mutual
Fire Insurance Co. v. Hopson7 in which a motion to vacate a stipulation
of discontinuance was denied, suggests a possibility that this bar of the
statute of limitations in actions against corporate directors may be circum-
vented by vacating discontinuances based on secret slettlements.
In 1934 stockholders instituted a derivative action against Hopson and
other directors of the Associated Gas & Electric Company alleging waste and
mismanagement of corporate funds. A stipulation of discontinuance was
subsequently signed; the settlement took the form of the purchase of plain-
tiff's stock by a wholly owned subsidiary of the corporation at a price approxi-
mately seven times its then market value.8 The settlement also provided for
a consent order requiring that all the papers on file with the clerc df the
* Manufacturers Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Hopson, 25 N. Y. S. (2d) 502 (Sup. Ct.
1940).
1. FED. RuLEs CIv. PRoc. 23(c). See 2 MooRE, FEDEAL PRACricE (1938) §23.06.
2. See Earl v. Brewer, 248 App. Div. 314, 289 N. Y. Supp, 150 (4th Dep't 1936);
Dresdner v. Goldman Sachs Trading Corp., 240 App. Div. 242, 269 N. Y. Supp, 360 (2d
Dep't 1934) ; Planten v. Nat'l Nassau Bank, 174 App. Div. 254, 160 N. Y. Supp. 297
(1st Dep't 1916); Beadleston v. Alley, 55 Hun 605, 7 N. Y. Supp. 747 (Sup. Ct. 2d
Dep't 1889) ; Brinckerhoff v. Bostwick, 99 N. Y. 185, 1 N. E. 663 (1885).
3. See Gerith v. Normandie Nat'l Securities Corp., 154 Misc. 615, 276 N. Y. Supp.
655 (Sup. Ct. 1933), aff'd, 241 App. Div. 717, 269 N. Y. Supp. 1007 (1st Dep't 1934),
aff'd, 266 N. Y. 525, 195 N. E. 183 (1935) ; Grant v. Greene Consol. Copper Co., 169
App. Div. 206, 154 N. Y. Supp. 596 (1st Dep't 1915).
4. Recovery resulting from a judgment against defendants runs in favor of the cor-
poration. Continental Securities Co. v. Belmont, 206 N. Y. 7, 99 N. E. 138 (1912).
5. What limitation will apply to a particular derivative action under New York law
is often uncertain. See Notes (1941) 54 HARV. L. Rav. 1040, (1941) 8 U. oF Ci. L.
REv. 364.
6. See Comment (1941) 54 HARV. L. Rav. 833, 835 n. 20.
7. 25 N. Y. S. (2d) 502 (Sup. Ct. 1940). Appeal now pending in Appellate Divi-
sion.
8 8. Compare the facts of the Hopson case with those of Rogers v, Hill, 34 F. Supp.
358 (S. D. N. Y. 1940).
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court be delivered to the attorney for defendants.0 In 1940, after new and
separate suits on the questioned transactions were barred by the statute of
limitations, other stockholders of the corporation and its trustee in reor-
ganization learned of the action and moved that the discontinuance be vacated
for fraud.
justice Shientag of the Supreme Court reluctantly held that under New
York law plaintiffs had the power to discontinue, and therefore the stipula-
tion of discontinuance was valid upon its face and could not be vacated by
motion. The court stated, however, that there seemed to be substantial basis
for petitioners' charges of fraud and collusion, and denied the motion with-
out prejudice to the institution of a plenary suit to vacate the discontinuance.
The ruling, however, did not specify which of petitioners' various allega-
tions would justify vacating the discontinuance if proved in a plenary suit,
and thus raises a question of substantive law.
The fact situation as delineated in the petition suggests the source of the
settlement consideration as the first possible basis for arguing in the plenary
suit that the discontinuance was fraudulent. The action was brought against
the directors, the corporation being joined as an indispensable party defend-
ant'0 to whom the benefit of any judgment would accrue,"' and yet the
funds that were used to buy off the plaintiffs came from a wholly owned
subsidiary of the corporation.' 2 The question of whether it is ever proper
to use corporation funds to settle suits against directors remains unsettled.
But it has been held improper for the corporation to pay the litigation ex-
penses of defending derivative suits brought against directors,r 3 and the
reasons underlying these decisions apply with even greater force to payment
by the corporation of settlements. The corporation has no direct interest
in proteeting its directors against a charge of wasting and mismanaging its
funds, especially to the extent of making a settlement which carries with it
the suggestion that the charge is not unfounded. Furthermore, the device
of a secret, corporation-paid settlement has often been used by malfeasant
directors to protect themselves by subjecting the corporate victim to a
"double looting."' 14 Such a settlement would be fraudulent because it in-
9. The petition to vacate the discontinuance alleges that thirty similar actions
brought by stockholders have been settled in the same general manner. R. 39-40.
10. BALLAN iNE, MANUAL OF CoRaoRATioN LAW AND PRAc'ricE (1930) § 186. See
Notes (1941) 50 YALE L. J. 1261, (1935) 44 Y.uz L. J. 1091.
11. See note 4 supra.
12. See General Rubber Co. v. Benedict, 164 App. Div. 332, 149 N. Y. Supp. M0
(1st Dep't 1914), aff'd, 215 N. Y. 18, 109 N. E. 96 (1915) (responsibility of director to
parent corporation for misuse of funds of subsidiary).
13. See Wood v. Nova Electric Corp., N. Y. L. J. Oct. 10, 1936, p. 1121, col. 7
(N. Y. City Court) (where suit was discontinued director has no right of reimburse-
ment for defense expenses); Monahan v. Kenny, 243 App. Div. 159, 283 N. Y. Supp.
323 (1st Dep't 1936) (where defendant directors lose suit). Cf. New York Dock Co.,
Inc. v. McCollum, 173 Misc. 106, 16 N. Y. S. (2d) 844 (Sup. Ct. 1939); Washington,
Litigation Expenses of Corporate Directors in Stockholders' Suits (1940) 40 Col- L.
REv. 431; N. Y. Laws 1941, c. 209.
14. See S. E. C. REPORT ON THE STUD " AND INVESTIGATION OF THE WonK, Ac'rivx-
TIES, PERSONNEL AND FUNCTIONS OF PROTECTIVE AND REORGANIZATIO, COn.!5ITTEES,
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volves sacrifice of the corporation by its directors who owe it a fiduciary
duty, as well as by the plaintiff stockholders, who purported to bring the
action in the name of the corporation.15
Against this "double looting" theory it may be argued that corporation-
paid settlements are sometimes proper because many suits which in form
are against the directors actually are strike suits.' 0 Despite lack of merit
in the complaint, these often constitute such a threat of harm to the corpora-
tion that its interest is better served by settlement than by victorious defense. 17
But if the problem of the strike suit is the only reason for holding that settling
suits against directors with corporation funds is not ipso facto improper, the
countervailing arguments should prevail, for prohibition of corporation-paid
settlements should reduce the profitability and thus the number of strike
suits.' ,
The "double looting" theory, while providing a valuable extension of the
protection of corporations against secret discontinuances, is necessarily limited
in its use to those cases where the settlement has been made with corpora-
tion funds. A theory of broader utility could be based upon the exaggerated
disparity between the size of plaintiffs' indirect financial injury and the mag-
nitude of the settlement sum in the Hopson case. The New York rule that
plaintiff may discontinue and retain the settlement proceeds is based upon
the policy of protecting the individual stockholder in the face of the hazards
of the derivative suit,19 but this protection should not be extended to sanction
payment to the plaintiff of a settlement many times the value of his total
interest in the corporation. Such a settlement does not conform to the con-
figuration of just compensation for wrongs suffered, but rather resembles
a bribe to maintain secrecy. The other provisions of many such settlements
re-enforce this conclusion.20 It might be argued that large settlements should
Pt. 1 (hereinafter cited as S. E. C. REPORT) 797; Hornstein, Legal Controls for Intracor-
porate Abuse-Present and Future (1941) 41 CoL. L. REV. 405, 426 n. 129.
15. See Gerith Realty Corp. v. Normandie Securities Corp., 154 Misc. 615, 616, 276
N. Y. Supp. 655, 656 (Sup. Ct. 1933); S. E. C. REPORr 704.
16. -See Comment, Extortionate Corporation Litigation: The Strike Suit (1934)
34 CoL. L. REv. 1308, which defines a strike suit as ". . . an action brought by a secur-
ity holder, not in good faith, but through the exploitation of its nuisance value, to force
the payment of a sum disproportionate to the normal value of his interest as the price
of discontinuance."
17. For examples of how the suit may injure the corporation see Washington, Stock-
holders' Derivative Suits: The Company's Role, and a Suggestion (1940) 25 CORN. L.
Q. 361, 369-370.
18. Defining a strike suit as one in which the plaintiff has no honest belief in his
case, it follows that strike suits would not be brought if plaintiffs knew in advance that
settlement would not be made. Where the plaintiff has faith in the cause of action it
would seem desirable, for protection of the corporation, that an open adjudication be had,
even though litigation of an ill-founded claim would occasionally injure the corporation.
But see Washington, op. cit. supra note 17.
19. For these hazards see Dresdner v. Goldman Sachs Trading Corp., 240 App.
Div. 242, 245-246, 269 N. Y. Supp. 360, 364-365 (2d Dep't 1934).
20. The pattern is substantially that employed by defendants in the Hopson case:
(1) The settlement takes the form of purchase of the plaintiff's stock so that he no
longer has an interest in the corporation (though the value of this move is largely sym-
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be permitted because they furnish an incentive for private policing which,
though not securing recovery for the wronged corporation, nevertheless
operates prospectively to deter commission of wrongs by directors."1 But
the validity of this argument is impaired by the fact that such actions are
often brought by large shareholders 22 and are frequently instigated by am-
bitious attorneys2 3 whose profit from a court-determined fee, though probably
not so great as that from a settlement, would nevertheless provide adequate
motivation.- '
Fraud found under the "bribe" theory might give rise to legal consequences
different from those of fraud found under the "double looting" theory, espe-
cially in regard to the availability of the original cause of action. If the "bribe"
theory be accepted, and plaintiff and defendant found to have conspired that
the corporation's claim be wrongfully abandoned, it follows that the purpose
of the fraud should be frustrated and the action be restored for intervention
by other shareholders. This result does not follow so ineluctably if the fraud
is found to lie only in the use of corporation funds to settle. Undoubtedly
"double looting" would give the corporation a new right of action for recovery
of the amount of the settlement consideration;25 but bridging the gap to the
original cause of action is less certain. Since fraud lies only in the use of
corporation funds to effect a settlement, it may be argued that recover), of
those funds gives adequate relief, arousing no necessity to halt the normal
running of the statute of limitations on the original cause of action. This is
especially true since reliance solely on the "double looting" theory presup-
poses judicial rejection of the "bribe" theory with its supporting argument
that the plaintiff owes the corporation a duty of faithfulness in prosecution
of the claim. There is a semantic argument, however, that the discontinuance.
being fraudulent, is a nullity, and that therefore the original action is still
pending and available for intervention. And the positions on the plaintiff's
duty of faithful prosecution could be reconciled thus: the plaintiff owes the
corporation no duty to continue the derivative suit; but he will not be accorded
the power irrevocably to end the suit where, by accepting a secret settlement
constituting an additional inroad to the corporation's treasury,20 he has demon-
bolic inasmuch as there is nothing to prevent the plaintiff from buying new stock at the
lower market price) ; (2) There is an understanding that attorneys for plaintiff will not
represent other stockholders of the corporation (R. 46-47) ; (3) The doc-ments and evi-
dence gathered by plaintiff are delivered over to the defendants: (4) Where the cor-
poration is made to pay the settlement bill, plaintiff is given a cashier's check, which
disguises the source of the funds (R., 47, 214).
21. See S. E. C. REPORT 797.
22. Large shareholders have an adequate motive to carry an action through to judg-
ment because a judgment in favor of the corporation benefits them by increasing the
value of their holdings.
23. S. E. C. REPoRT 883.
24. See Hornstein, Counsel Fees in Stockholders' Deri'vative Suits (1939) 39 CoL
L. REv. 784, 814.
25. See Erie Ry. Co. v. Vanderbilt, 5 Hun 123 (N. Y. Sup. Ct. Ist Dep't 1875).
26. The argument requires plaintiff's knowledge of the source of the settlement
funds. This knowledge is superficially difficult to reconcile with the payment being made
by cashier's check (see note 20 supra), but in view of the well-knowni possibility that
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strated his willingness to injure the corporation. It is submitted that such
a rule would be desirable. It would permit the vigilant stockholder to recover
for himself. But the corporation might thereby escape the expense of that
recovery except where the directors are willing to risk divesting themselves
of the statute of limitations on the original action.27
As between the two theories, "double looting" involves fewer juridical
difficulties than the "bribe" theory. The facts giving rise to the former are
characterized by definite and ascertainable harm to the corporation in the
form of depletion of its treasury. The latter throws open the door to the
confusing dichotomy of nonfeasance and misfeasance, for it invokes no "posi-
tive" harm to the corporation, but merely the failure to receive the benefit
which would accrue to it from a judgment. The "double looting" theory
also involves fewer administrative difficulties in application than the "bribe"
theory. The presence of fraud under the "double looting" theory would
depend merely upon the answer to the objective question, "Was the settle-
ment paid with corporation funds?" The "bribe" theory, however, involves
the intangibles inherent in the question of good faith, as well as the difficult
calculation of the value of the cause of action, and would engender much
vexatious litigation challenging the validity of discontinuances. Neverthe-
less, judicial acceptance of both theories is necessary to extend the protection
of corporations against secret and disadvantageous discontinuances made
possible by the New York rule.
But acceptance even of both these theories would not reach the crux of
the problem of protecting corporations against secret settlements. The value
of the remedies afforded by them would be merely ameliorative because they
depend upon discovery of secret settlements, most of which never come to
light. Adequate protection of corporations against secret settlements requires
legislation 28 to embody the substance of the federal rule 29 requiring court
directors may use corporate funds, the plaintiff should be deemed to have constructive
knowledge where he has failed to make reasonable efforts to ascertain the source of the
settlement funds. In the Hopson case attorneys for plaintiffs requested a writing that
none of the funds came from the corporation, but took no further action when the re-
quest was denied (R., 47). It should be noted that a false statement of defendants
to the effect that corporation funds were not being used would be misrepresentation
probably constituting fraudulent concealment such as would suspend the running of the
statute of limitations until discovery of the misrepresentation; N. Y. Cxv. PRAc. AcT
§ 48(5) ; Druckerman v. Harbord, N. Y. L. J. Oct. 29, 1940, p. 1309, col. 4 (Sup. Ct.
1940). See Notes (1941) 54 HARV. L. RaV. 1040, 1043, (1941) 8 U. OF Gi. L. Rv. 364.
27. So long as it remains possible for stockholders to vacate the discontinuance
and intervene, the running of the statute of limitations would afford the directors no
protection.
28. The objective could be attained by a statute amending the Civil Practice Act,
or by an order of a majority of the justices of the Appellate Division adding a new
rule to the Rules of Civil Procedure, pursuant to the Judiciary Law § 82 as amended
by Laws of 1924, c. 172. See mimeographed report, CommiMTTE ON LAW REFORM OF TIM,
ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEw YORK, SETTLEMENT OF' STOCKHOLDERS'
DERIVATIvE AcriONS.
29. FED. RULES CIV. PROC. 23(c). See Moore & Cohn, Federal Class Alctions-Jur-




approval and such notice to other stockholders as the court directs for dis-
continuance of a derivative suit.30 If cast in the form of consent judgments,3 1
court-approved settlements would be res judicata thus discouraging a multi-
plicity of suits on a given cause of action. The possibility that the settlement
might be contrary to the corporation's interest would be diminished by court
supervision and a requirement of notice to other stockholders.32 Such settle-
ments would, of course, obviate the problems here discussed.
ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS IN POSTAL FRAUD ORDER
PROCEEDINGS*
Tn_ Postmaster General may, "upon evidence satisfactory to him," issue
fraud orders closing the facilities of the Post Office Department to persons
who have used them to disseminate fraudulent schemes.1 Since deprivation
of postal facilities would be fatal to any enterprise, businessmen have sought
thoroughgoing judicial review of such orders. The most common device
has been the bill to enjoin enforcement of the fraud order. But judges have
almost invariably denied this relief, saying that the Postmaster General's
order will not be enjoined if supported by substantial evidence.2
Discouraged by the repeated failure of such attacks,3 litigants have lately
assaulted the legality of the hearing which preceded the unfavorable order.4
30. The rule recommended by the Committee on Law Reform (see note 22 supra)
reads: "A stockholder's derivative action shall not be discontinued, dismissed or com-
promised without the approval of the court, and then only after notice of the proposed
discontinuance, dismissal or compromise shall have been given to stockholders in such
manner as the court directs."
31. Gerith Realty Corp. v. Normandie Nat'l Securities Corp., 154 Misc. 615, 276
N. Y. Supp. 655 (Sup. Ct. 1933); Skipworth v. Phoenix Securities Corp., N. Y. L J.,
June 21, 1940, p. 2818, col. 5 (Sup. Ct.).
32. See McLaughlin, Capacity of Plaintiff-Stockholder to Terminate a Slockholder's
Sit (1937) 46 YA.E L. J. 421, 435; S. E. C. RPoaRT 883.
*Pike v. Walker, App. D. C., Mar. 17, 1941.
1. 26 STAT. 466 (1890), 39 U.S. C. §§ 259, 732 (1934) (Local postmasters are
forbidden to pay imoney orders as well as to deliver mail).
2. Farley v. Heininger, 105 F. (2d) 79 (App. D. C. 1939) Leach v. Carlile,
258 -U: S. 138. (1922) ; Nat'l Conference on Legalizing Lotteries v. Farley, 96 F. (2d)
861 (App. D. C. 1938); Farley v. Simmons, 99 F. (2d) 343 (App. D. C. 1933). The
substantial. evidence rule has apparently supplanted other standards giving the Post-
master General more discretion. Cf. Putnam v. Morgan, 172 Fed. 450 (C. C. S. D. N. Y.
1909); Wheeler v. Farley, 7 F. Supp. 433 (S. D. Cal. 1934) (order sustained if sup-
ported by any evidence whatsoever).
3. For the few instances in which courts have held fraud orders unvarranted,
see American School of Magnetic Healing v. McAnnulty, 187 U. S. 94 (1902); Hurley
v. Dolan, 297 Fed. 825 (C. C. A. 1st, 1924); Rosenberger v. Harris, 136 Fed. 1001
(C. C. ,V. D. Mo. 1905); Moxie Nerve Food Co. v. Holland, 141 Fed. 202 (C. C. R. I.
1905).
4. Plapao Laboratories v. Farley, 92 F. (2d) 228 (App. D. C. 1937) (order issued
by Acting Postmaster General held valid on ground that he had considered the evi-
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This new strategy was stimulated by the Morgan decisions, which laid down
certain procedural requirements for administrative hearings.5 But this new
basis proved unavailing in the recent case of Pike v. Walker0 where the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia refused to interfere with the
fraud order on the ground that appellant had failed to show that the com-
plaint against him was unfounded. Placing entire emphasis on the result
reached in the administrative hearing, the Court minimized the importance
of the procedural standards enunciated in the Morgan cases. Thus peti-
tioner's attack on the adequacy of the hearing met with the same treatment
previously accorded litigants challenging the sufficiency of the evidence.
Although the court avoided decision of the constitutional issue, Pike v.
Walker does present the question of whether the administrative procedure
of the Post Office Department fulfills the requirements of due process.
In Pike v. Walker the fraud order was issued in accordance with tradi-
tional departmental routine.7 Following an investigation by an inspector, a
trial attorney for the Post Office prepares a memorandum of charges and
briefs culminating in an order to respondent to show cause why a fraud
order should not be issued. At the hearing, which is conducted informally
and without written rules of procedure,8 this trial attorney and respondent's
counsel present testimony to a hearing officer who has had no prior con-
nection with the case. At the hearing neither party may issue subpoenas
or take depositions, 9 but some hearsay testimony is admitted.10 At the close
dence) ; National Weeklies v. Farley, (D. D. C. 1939, unreported) (intermediate report
not necessary in fraud order proceedings).
5. The Morgan cases have had a checkered history. Treating the question of
whether the Secretary of Agriculture gave to market agencies a full and fair hearing,
the Supreme Court in remanding the first case held that the officer who makes the
determination must also consider the evidence. Morgan v. United States, 298 U. S. 468
(1936). On second consideration, the Supreme Court again invalidated the order, this
time on the ground that there had not been a fair opportunity to know and to meet
the claims of the opposing party. Morgan v. United States, 304 U. S. 1 (1938). The
Secretary's subsequent order reopening the proceedings was then set aside by the
District Court. Morgan v. United States, 24 F. Supp. 214 (W. D. Mo. 1938). But,
on the third appeal, the Supreme Court held that the Secretary's action was proper.
United States v. Morgan, 307 U. S. 183 (1939). The controversy was finally settled
by the decision in United States v. Morgan, 61 Sup. Ct. 999 (U. S. 1941),
6. App. D. C. Mar. 17, 1941.
7. See ATT'ey GEN'S COMM. ON ADMIN. PROC.: POST OFIxCE DEPARTMENT, Mouo-
graph No. 13, 34-87.
8. This absence of written rules may lead respondents to believe that the ordinary
procedure of the department is being altered to their disadvantage.
9. Although the failure to make either depositions or subpoenas available works
to the particular disadvantage of respondents, it is very unlikely that it would be
held to deny due process. See GELLHORx, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (1940) 595. But see
Comment (1940) 53 HARv. L. REv. 842.
10. The admission of hearsay testimony is not a ground for reversal if other sub-
stantial evidence has been presented. Farley v. Simmons, 99 F. (2d) 343 (App. D. C.
1938); Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 95 F. (2d) 390 (C. C. A. 2d, 1938), aff'd
and modified, 305 U. S. 197 (1938).
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of the case, the trial attorney consults with the hearing officer and prepares
a draft of proposed findings of fact and a decision. This report is examined
by the hearing officer and assistant solicitor who frequently make minor
changes. No intermediate report is submitted to respondent," who may have
delivered his oral argument to the Solicitor before the latter has received
the draft of the proposed findings or become familiar with the record. 12
When this draft has been approved by the Solicitor, it is submitted to the
Postmaster General. Because of his many duties, however, the Postmaster
can obviously give only cursory consideration to most cases.
In the Pike v. Walker controversy the Government attempted to silence
objections to this procedure by advancing the omnibus argument that the
fraud order could have been issued summarily without any notice or hearing
since an individual has no constitutional right to have his mail delivered.' 3
While the court did not rule specifically on this contention, dicta in its
opinion indicate that one cannot be denied the right to use the mails without
a hearing. Although the statute setting out the procedure in fraud order
cases does not mention a hearing, the court's indication that one is required
accords with precedent' 4 and common understanding. Since this govern-
11. The absence of an intermediate report in this situation has not been held to
vitiate the hearing because the issues are sufficiently clear without it. National Wceklies
v. Farley, (D. C. C. 1939, unreported); accord, NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co.,
304 U. S. 333 (1938). The Post Office Department buttresses this argument by stating
that preparation of an intermediate report would lengthen the hearing, thereby giving
offenders more time to profit from their fraudulent undertakings. The time element
would disappear, however, if the Post Office Department could temporarily impound
respondent's mail. Unfortunately the agency does not possess this power. Donnell Mfg.
Co. v. Wyman, 156 Fed. 415 (C. C. E. D. Mo. 1907). See Meyers v. Cheesman, 174
Fed. 783 (C. C. A. 6th, 1909) ; Ii re Rice, 256 Fed. 858 (S. D. N.Y. 1919) (stipulation
allowing the impounding of mail pending the hearing approved).
12. This record is not available to respondent. Although he may acquire a transcript
by furnishing his own court stenographer, the practice is not generally followed because
of the expense involved. Ignorance of the contents of the record may seriously hamper
respondent in his oral argument before the Solicitor.
13. The Government raised the further contentions that the issuance of a fraud
order is an exercise of the police power which does not involve property rights and
that the Postmaster General is under no duty to examine evidence or hear arguments
since he is not discharging a judicial function. For cases supporting the contention
that the use of the mails is a privilege which may be summarily denied, see Gitlow
v. Iiely, 44 F. (2d) 227, 229 (S.D.N.Y. 1930) (exclusion of publications from the
mails not an interference with "freedom of the press"); People's United States Ban:
v. Gilson, 140 Fed. 1, 5 (C. C. E. D. Mo. 1905), aff'd, 161 Fed. 286 (C. C. A. 8th, 1903)
(Postmaster General may determine ex parte that concern is conducting scheme to
defraud); Missouri Drug Co. v. Wyman, 129 Fed. 623, 626 (C. C. E. D. Mo. 1904)
(constitutionality of fraud order statute sustained on "privilege" theory).
14. See Burton v. United States, 202 U. S. 344, 371 (1906); Milwaukee Pub. Co.
v. Burleson, 255 U. S. 407, 430 (1921) (Congress' power over Post Office subject to
limitations of Bill of Rights); Public Clearing House v. Coyne, 194 U. S. 497, 507
(1904) (Congress may not extend to one the benefit of its postal service and deny it
to another of the same class); People's United States Bank v. Gilson, 161 Fed. 226,
290 (C. C. A. 8th, 1908) (authority of Postmaster General not discretionary); Donnell
Mfg. Co. v. Wyman, 156 Fed. 415, 416 (C. C. E. D. Mo. 1907) (It is very doubtful if
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mental monopoly' has become the main artery through which people con-
duct their affairs, the notion that the use of the mails is a privilege can hardly
prevail today.
The second and more specific argument made by the Government defended
the existing procedure as constituting actual due process. Appellant con-
tended that he had been denied a fair hearing because the Postmaster General,
who had signed the -order, had not considered the evidence.' 0 Appellant's
allegation that the Postmaster General's total knowledge of the case was
gleaned from a glance through several pages of the findings of fact is sig-
nificant in light of the Morgan decisions which he assumed to be applicable
to the Post Office Department. This supposition would seem to be justified.
Although the Morgan cases arose under the Packers and Stockyards Act,11
which specifically required a "full hearing," the principles there enunciated
undoubtedly possess a significance apart from statutory interpretation. In
the opinions the Court has stressed the constitutional requirement of due
process by its continued references to the necessity for fair play.' 8 Further-
more the Morgan decisions have been used in testing the validity of hearings
before various administrative bodies.' 9 In the two instances where the
Morgan cases were relied upon to support an attack on the Post Office
procedure, the court has said, not that those cases were inapplicable, but
rather that the requirements they set out had been observed. 20
In the first Morgan decision the question of whether the Secretary of
Agriculture must read the evidence was raised on the pleadings. After
enunciating the rule that he who decides must also hear, the court remanded
the case for testimony on" that point. In the second trial it was shown that
the Secretary had "dipped into the record" and read the briefs and transcript
of the oral argument. This testimony apparently obviated the difficulties
raised in the first case, but the court, deciding against the Government on
a different ground, gave no definite answer. These decisions do not reveal
the exact thoroughness with which the head of an agency must appraise
the evidence before he signs the order.21 Since the Postmaster General
findings are conclusive in the absence of a hearing); Elliott Works v. Frisk, 58 F.
(2d) 820, 824 (S. D. Iowa 1932) (full and fair hearing should be given, but investiga-
tion may be secret and ex parte).
15. 35 STAT. 1124 (1909), 18 U.S.C. §§ 306, 308 (1934) (The transmission of a
letter or packet by private express is a criminal offense).
16. If the order had been signed by a subordinate who had considered the evidence,
the Postmaster General's failure to appraise the evidence would not have been objec-
tionable. Plapao Laboratories v. Farley, 92 F. (2d) 228 (App. D. C. 1937).
17. 42 STAT. 166 (1921), 7 U.S.C. §211 (1934).
18. That fair play is an element of due process is emphasized in Ohio Bell Tele-
phone Co. v. Public Utilities Comm. of Ohio, 301 U. S. 292, 300, 304-305 (1937),
Railroad Comm. of Cal. v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 302 U. S. 388, 393 (1938), and
Opp Cotton Mills v. Wage and Hour Adm'r, 111 F. (2d) 23, 28 (C.C.A. 5th, 1940),
aff'd, 61 Sup. Ct. 524 (U. S. 1941).
19. See Swift & Co. v. Wallace, 105 F. (2d) 848, 861 (C. C. A. 7th, 1939) ; Cunard
S. S. Co. v. Elting, 97 F. (2d) 373, 376 (C. C. A. 2d, 1938).
20. See note 4 supra.
21. Heads of agencies may apparently rely upon others to sift the evidence. See
NLRB v. Biles Coleman Lumber Co., 98 F. (2d) 16, 17 (C. C. A. 9th, 1938); Cupples
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glanced through several pages of the findings'of fact in Pike v. Walker,
it might be held that the nebulous standard set by the Morgan decisions was
satisfied.
A third argument which the Government might have utilized in Pike v.
Walker is the doctrine that where assistants conduct the hearing it will be
conclusively presumed that the Postmaster General considered the evidence.-
A similar presumption is entertained whenever the head of an agency per-
sonally hears an oral argument.m The present methods of conducting hear-
ings may also be preserved if the Postmaster General is silent as to the
manner in which he considered the evidence. Courts will grant interroga-
tories only in very special circumstances, 24 and there is growing reluctance
to probe the mental processes of administrative officials exercising judicial
functions. 25
It is reasonable to suppose that the decision in Pike v. Walker would have
been the same if the constitutional issue had been specifically considered.
The Government could not have secured a favorable judgment on its argu-
ment that the power to issue a fraud order is purely discretionary. Since
this assumes that persons have no constitutional right to use the mails, it
seems regrettable that Government counsel should take such an unneces-
sary stand.2 6 But its second argument that the present procedure conforms
with the standards relative to consideration of the evidence which were laid
down in the first Morgan case seems sound. Moreover, the decision har-
monizes with the requirements of the second Morgan case since it is difficult
to suppose that the Constitution prohibits consultation between trial attorneys
and hearing officers or requires an intermediate report in a case like this
where the issues are simple and well known to respondent. 7 The further
contention that the Postmaster General is conclusively presumed to have
considered the evidence could also have been used to reach the decision
in Pike v. Walker.28
Apart from the issue of whether the present system satisfies the requisites
of due process, there is the further question of the administrative desira-
bility of that system. In this view, shortcomings do exist and they should
be corrected. The Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Pro-
Co. Manuf'rs v. NLRB, 103 F. (2d) 953, 958 (C. C. A. 8th, 1939). But see NLRB
v. Cherry Cotton Mfills, 98 F. (2d) 444, 447 (CC. C.A. 5th, 1938).
22. See Lewis Pub. Co. v. Nyyman, 152 Fed. 787, 791 (C. C. E. D. Mo. 1907);
Crane v. Nichols, 1 F. (2d) 33, 35 (S. D. Tem. 1924).
23. See United States v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 20 F. Supp. 427, 449 (S. D.
Cal. 1937).
24. NLRB v. Lane Cotton Mills Co., 108 F. (2d) 568 (C. C.A. 5th, 1940).,
25. United States v. Morgan, 61 Sup. Ct. 999 (U. S. 1941); NLRB v. Botany
Worsted Mills, 106 F. (2d) 263 (C. C. A. 3d, 1939) (Judge Clark said that members of
the NLRB should be accorded the same protection extended to jurors since the eighteenth
century).
26. Postal officials are still advancing this absolutistic argument, however. See
9 U. S. L. NVEE 2599 (1941). See also note 13 mipra.
27. See note 11 supra.
28. See note 22 supra.
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cedure 29 criticizes the manner of making up the findings of fact, the una-
vailability of subpoenas and depositions, and the failure of the agency to
issue rules of practice and to furnish respondents with a copy of the record.
To remedy these inadequacies the Committee recommends the use of more
trial machinery and the transference of the post-hearing functions of the
trial attorney to the hearing officer whose findings would be conclusive if
reasonable. It would not, of course, be feasible to require the Postmaster
General to consider every fraud order.30 The Committee's proposals seem
adequate to remedy existing evils since they would sharpen the issues,
eliminate the necessity for an intermediate report, and end any present feeling
that the hearing is being conducted before a monitor or that judge and
prosecutor are one and the same.
The Committee's recommendations strike an acceptable balance between
the interest of preserving individual rights on the one hand and that of
fostering administrative efficiency on the other.3 1 Although the courts have
been alert in discovering any defect in ordinary administrative proceedings
which might prejudice a person,32 they have tolerated comparatively arbitrary
action in the issuance of fraud orders. Since these orders proscribe schemes
of the most reprehensible type, ranging from tuberculosis "cures" 3 3 to quix-
otic swindle schemes, 34 this judicial leniency is understandable. But the
Committee did not succumb to this natural tendency to consider the man
who gets into trouble with the postal authorities as automatically deserving
harsh treatment.35  Its proposals recognize that administrative agencies are
created to administer statutes within due process, not to provide due process
for its own sake.3 6
29. See ATrT'y GEN.'S Co m. ON ADMIN. PRoc., ADMIN. PROC. IN GoVT AGENCIES
(1941) 150-155. The Committee further recommends that the department be empowered
to impound a respondent's incoming mail for the duration of the hearing. It also
recommends that the activities of the Post Office Department be integrated with those
of the FTC, since there is considerable concurrence of jurisdiction between the two.
30. See People's United States Bank v. Gilson, 140 Fed. 1, 5 (C. C. E. D. Mo. 1905) ;
Lewis Pub. Co. v. Wyman, 152 Fed. 787, 791 (C. C. E. D. Mo. 1907) ; Crane v. Nichols,
1 F. (2d) 33, 34 (S. D. Tex. 1924).
31. Comment (1932) 80 U. OF PA. L. REv. 878.
32. Montgomery Ward & Co. v. NLRB, 103 F. (2d) 147 (C. C. A. 8th, 1939)
(bias of hearing officer held ground for invalidation of order).
33. Aycock v. O'Brien, 28 F. (2d) 817 (C. C. A, 9th, 1928).
34. Public Clearing House v. Coyne, 194 U. S. 497 (1904) (insurance payable on
contingency of marriage); Elliott Works v. Frisk, 58 F. (2d) 820 (S. D. Iowa 1932)
("Nu-Life" instantaneous battery restorer).
35., This attitude might explain the disparity between Justice Groner's decision
in Pike v. Walker and the views he expressed as a member of the Attorney General's
Commission on Administrative Procedure. In his opinion he refused to consider the
adequacy of the hearing because he felt that the correct result had been attained. But
when serving on the Committee he placed more emphasis on an open, fair and unbiased
hearing than on administrative efficiency. Consequently, he was forced to disagree with
the majority's conclusion that a satisfactory separation of functions could be accom-
plished within the agencies and felt that some additional guaranties of the independence
of the office of hearing commissioner were needed.
36. Feller, Administrative Procedure and the Public Interest-The Restlts of Due
Process (1940) 25 WASH. U. L. Q. 308.
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THE EFFECT UPON THE SURETY OF A RESERVATION CLAUSE
IN A RELEASE OF THE PRINCIPAL DEBTOR*
UNDER the doctrine of strictisshni juris,' the surety is released from his
obligations whenever the creditor, without the surety's consent, releases the
principal debtor,2 and generally when he extends the time of payment of
the debt,3 or otherwise alters the principal's duties set out in the original
contract.4 In its development, this doctrine has been so modified that a
creditor, in altering the original money obligations of the principal debtor,
may preserve the duties owed to him by an ex-press reservation of his rights
against the surety. In construing the two clauses of the agreement, the courts
through a long line of decisions have viewed the contract as an entity, and
have refused to find in the reservation a condition repugnant to the primary
grant.5 Although this modification of suretyship law has been circumscribed
at times by a demand for specificity of terms in the reservation0 and by a
refusal to admit parol evidence of the intent of the parties entering into the
written agreement,7 it has seldom been denied effect by the American courts.8
* Gholson v. Savin, 31 N. E. (2d) 858 (Ohio Sup. Ct. 1941).
1. SrPNcER, SunzrvsHin (1913) §§ 90, 209; REronr OF N. Y. LAW REvIsIo: Co!-.
(1937) 879. For the purposes of this note, no attempt has been made to differentiate
between a surety and a guarantor. For the distinction, see SiTEAm.s, Sutnnrysnip (Fein-
singer's ed. 1934) § 6; ARANT, SURETYSHIP Aim GuAnArT (1931) § 14.
2. 4 VILLS oN, CoNTR cTs (Rev. ed. 1936) § 1220. See REsTAT E:;T, CoNTMrs
(1932) §121 (2), Comment a.
3. Union Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Hanford, 143 U. S. 187 (1892); 4 Wn.LsTo:;,
CoNrAcTs (Rev. ed. 1936) § 1222. Under the NEGoTIABLE I.NsrME.s LAW § 119
an accommodation maker is not discharged by an extension. Cellers v. Meachem, 49
Ore. 186, 89 Pac. 426 (1907).
4. United States v. Freel, 186 U. S. 309 (1902) ; 4 WILLISTO:, Co:MrtACrs (Rev.
ed. 1936) §§ 1239 et seq.
The discharge of the surety is not conditioned by any possible benefit that the surety
may derive from the agreement between the creditor and debtor. Katz v. Leblang, 243
App. Div. 421, 277 N. Y. Supp. 850 (1st Dep't 1935) ; see American Surety Co. v. Greek
Catholic Union, 284 U. S. 563, 569 (1932). Contra: Cambridge Savings Bank v. Hyde,
131 Mass. 77, 41 Am. Rep. 193 (1881).
The English courts usually do not discharge the surety if the alteration cannot be
other than beneficial to him. See Egbert v. National Crown Bank, L. R. (1918) A. C.
903, 908.
5. Morgan v. Smhith, 70 N. Y. 537 (1877); Price v. Barker, 4 El. & B!. 760 (Q.
B. 1855).
6. Edwards v. Goode, 228 Fed. 664 (C. C. A. 5th, 1916).
7. Brown v. Ayer & Bates, 24 Ga. 288 (1857) ; Clark V,. Mallory, 185 I11. 227, 56
N. E. 1099 (1900). The English rule is contrary. Wyke v. Rogers, 1 De G., M. & G.
408, 42 Eng. Rep. 609 (Ch. 1852). But cf. Ex parte Glendinning, Buck, 517 (Eq. 1819).
8. The minority view has been adopted in a very few jurisdictions. Those cases
not following the reservation rule are: Gustine v. Union Bank of La., 10 Rob. 412 (La.
1845) (extension of time); Spies v. Nat. City Bank, 174 N. Y. 22-2, 66 N. E. 73b (1903)
(applying law of Louisiana); Robson v. Brown, 57 S. W. 83 (Tex. Civ. App. 190) (ex-
tension of time) ; cf. Robinson v. Offutt, 7 T. B. Mon., 540 (Ky. 1'32S) ; Citizens' State
Bank of Coleman v. Rosenwald, 63 S. D. 50, 256 N. W. 264 (1934) ; see Price v. Barker,
1941] 1485
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
In one of the few recent cases0 which have turned on the consequences
of a reservation of this kind, the Ohio Supreme Court10 refused to follow
the traditional line of decisions. A lessor had obtained separate judgments
for rent agdiinst both the lessee and his assignee, but upon the receipt of
a lesser sum from the assignee, he had granted the assignee a full discharge
with a reservation of all his rights to enforce the judgment against the
lessee." Upon a subsequent action against the lessee, the court denied
recovery on the grounds that the lessee was in the legal position of surety 1"
and was discharged by the agreement between the lessor and the assignee.
The reservation of rights against the surety was rendered ineffective.
4 El. & Bi. 760, 778, 779 (Q. B. 1855) ; Owen v. Homan, 3 Mac. & G. 378, 400, 401, 42
Eng. Rep. 307, 316 (Ch. 1851) (vigorous denial by Lord Truro of the validity of a res-
ervation), aff'd on other grounds, H. L. Cas. 997, 10 Eng. Rep. 752 (1853) (reasoning
of lower court specifically overruled).
The NE(OTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW § 120, codifies the prevailing rule. BRANNAN,
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW (Beutel's 6th ed. 1938) 994. Bank of Italy v. Synines,
118 Cal. App. 716, 5 P. (2d) 956 (1931); cf. Cellers v. Meachem, 49 Ore. 186, 89 Pac.
426 (1907) ; Nat. Bank v. Funke, 215 Wis. 541, 255 N. W. 147, 93 A. L. R. 365 (1934).
9. Diligent inquiry has discovered only three cases in the past 25 years turning on
the validity of reservations, in all of which the reservation was upheld. City Nat. Bank
& Trust Co. v. Burnham, 297 Ill. App. 211, 17 N. E. (2d) 505 (1938) ; Karcher v. Bur-
bank, 303 Mass. 303, 21 N. E. (2d) 542, 124 A. L. R. 1292 (1939) ; Citizens' State Bank
of Coleman v. Rosenwald, 63 S. D. 50, 256 N. W. 264 (1934).
10. Gholson v. Savin, 31 N. E. (2d) 858 (Ohio Sup. Ct. 1941). In the principal
case, the plaintiff attempted to invoke the joint debtor statute of Ohio, which provides
that a composition with one joint debtor shall not discharge the other debtors. Oto
GEN. CODE (Page, 1935) §§ 8079-84. The court refused to apply this statute to a situa-
tion involving a suretyship relation. 31 Ibid. 858, 861.
11. Possibly the common law rule that payment of a lesser sum in satisfaction of a
larger does not discharge the debt, has prevented a more frequent use of the reservation
clause. See ANSON, CONTRACTs (Corbin's ed. 1930) § 140; Foakes v. Beer, 9 App. Cas.
605 (1884). The principal in the instant case had paid only $2,000 in satisfaction of a
judgment for $2,844.75. The creditor's action in making the discharge part of the court
record was held to be sufficient to constitute a complete release. See cases cited in
Gholson v. Savin, 31 N. E. (2d) 858, at 864 (Ohio Sup. Ct. 1941).
12. Although the lessor may never have consented, the lessee is accorded all the
rights and privileges of a surety by operation of law. As long as privity of estate between
the assignee and the lessor exists, the assignee is primarily liable and the lessee secondar-
ily liable; thus by the assignment of the lease an involuntary or constructive suretyship
relation is erected. 3 THOmpSON, REAL PROPERTY (Perm. ed. 1940) § 1412.
A suretyship by law is also erected in other transactions in which one party is held
liable for duties which should, in fairness and equity, be performed by another. Wanner
v. Louis Wanner, Jr., Inc., 300 Fed. 376 (E. D. Pa. 1924). These may include (1) con-
veyance of property to a grantee who assumes the liability of the mortgage (In rc Roth,
272 Fed. 516 (N. D. Ohio 1920)) ; (2) a dissolution of a partnership at which time the
new firm assumes the liabilities of the retiring partners (Colgrove v. Tallman, 67 N. Y.
95, 23 Am. Rep. 90 (1876)) ; (3) a contract involving the delegation of duties to an ob-
ligor for the benefit of third party creditors (Barnard v. Huff, 252 Mich. 258, 233 N. W.
213 (1930)). Contra: Denison University v. Manning, 65 Ohio St. 138, 61 N. E. 706
(1901); Shapleigh Hardware Co. v. Wells, 90 Tex. 110, 37 S. W. 411 (1896).
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In ruling against the lessor in the Gholson case, the Ohio court has
rejected a doctrine that first arose at the close of the Eighteenth Century
when strictissimi juris was being Applied with all its original rigor. The early
development of the right of reservation grew out of an unreported English
opinion, Richard Burke's case, which involved an action by a creditor against
a co-surety after the former had given an extension of time to the principal
debtor. According to the reports of the decision in subsequent opinions,1a
Lord Thurlow in Burke's case suggested, by way of dictum, that the surety
was released .only if he were denied his remedy against the principal, and
that if the creditor had reserved his rights against the surety, the action would
have been successful, for then the surety would have had recourse against
the principal debtor. This circular rule, first applied to agreements by the
creditor with the principal to extend the time of payment of the debt,14 was
gradually expanded indiscriminately to include releases of the principal, 15
until in 1846 the rule was "considered as settled." 10 The power of the
creditor to reserve rights against the surety was generally recognized as an
accepted rule of law by most American courts,1 which also failed to dis-
tinguish between its application to an extension of time agreement and its
application to an unconditional discharge of the principal.
The orthodox rationale advanced by the courts to uphold the reservation
clause in either extensions of time or releases is premised on the assumption
that, inasmuch as the principal debtor has specifically agreed to accept a
"conditional" extension of time or a "conditional" release from the creditor,
13. Owen v. Homan, 3 Mac. & G. 378, 386, 42 Eng. Rep. 307, 311 (h. 18S51) (de-
fendant's argument), aff'd on othcr grounds, Owen v. Homan, 4 H. L. Cas. 957, 10
Eng. Rep. 752 (1853); Boultbee v. Stubbs, 18 Ves. Jr. 20, 22, 34 Eng. Rep. M (Ch.
1811) (dictum); Ex parte Gifford, 6 Ves. Jr. 805, 809, 31 Eng. Rep. 1318, 1320 (Ch.
1802) (dictum); English v. Dailey, 2 Bos. & P. 61 (C. P. 1800).
14. Boultbee v. Stubbs, 18 Ves. Jr. 20, 34 Eng. Rep. 225 (Ch. 1811) ; Ex parle Glen-
dinning, Buck, 517 (Eq. 1819).
15. The first application of the reservation clause to effect a "release" involved
an agreement betveen the creditor and a co-surety, in which the creditor preserved his
right of action against the other co-sureties. Ex parte Gifford, 6 Ves. Jr. 805, 31 Eng. Rep.
1318 (Ch. 1802). In Stewart v. Eden, 2 Caines 121 (N. Y. 1804) a holder of a note was
permitted to release one of the several joint makers, except for his liability to the in-
dorsers; in a subsequent action by the holder, the indorsers were not permitted to set the
agreement up as a defense. In Solly v. Forbes, 2 Brod. & B. 38, 129 Eng. Rep. 871 1 C.
P. 1820) the agreement between the creditor and the principal provided that if it vere
necessary to obtain a remedy against the surety, the creditor could continue to hold the
principal liable. The reservation was directed against the party released.
Without differentiating between the varying fact situations, the English courts un-
wittingly extended the rule upon authority of these cases to include covenants not to sue
and releases of the principal. Ex parte Carstairs, Buck, 560 (Eq. 1820); Nichols v.
Norris, 3 Barn. & Ad. 41 (Y. B. 1831); In re Natal Investment Co., L R. 6 Ch. 43
(1870).
16. Kearsley v. Cole, 16 M. & V. 128, 136, 153 Eng. Rep. 1128, 1131 (E.%. 14wJJ
(dictum for the surety had consented to the agreement between the creditors and the
principal debtor).
17. See Rockville Nat Bank v. Holt, 58 Conn. 523, 20 Adt. twt, t lb0j; Faneuil
Hall Nat. Bank v. MAeloon, 183 Mass. 66, 66 N. E. 410 (1903).
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he thereby impliedly agreed that the surety's right to reimbursement should
not be impaired. Thus he cannot complain if the surety, after fulfilling his
obligations to the creditor, seeks redress 'from him. In following what is
said to be the intention of the parties,18 often the determining factor, the
courts have claimed that the reservation clause rebuts the implication that
the surety was meant to be discharged. 19
This reasoning is fortified by the contention that such a reservation pre-
vents impairment of the rights of the surety against the debtor. When the
debt is due and payable, the surety may make the payment and put himself
in the position of the creditor. The surety may proceed against the principal,
who cannot set up as a defense the new arrangement with the creditor, for
in that arrangement the rights of the surety have been "expressly" reserved.
As a result, it has been maintained that, as the surety's contract has not
been changed, no equitable reason exists to justify his discharge.20  Some
courts also have accepted the rationalization that the extension of time or
the discharge is conditional upon the approval of the surety, who, if he
objects, must pay the creditor and then enforce his claim against the
principal.
21
An often repeated fictional justification for the reservation rule has grown
out of the treatment of the new agreement between the creditor and the
principal as a covenant not to sue22 -attributing thereto the same legal
consequences whether the agreement was a covenant not to sue for a definite
period of time or whether it was in effect a covenant never to sue. By
this construction, the agreement between the creditor and the principal is
made comparable to a covenant not to sue joint debtors or joint tortfeasors
under which the creditor can maintain his right of action against all the
joint debtors, becoming liable in turn to the covenantee for any damage which
the latter may suffer by breach of the covenant.2 3 In the early development
of contract theory, covenants not to sue, either between the two original
parties or between the creditor and a third person, could not be set up as
18. Pacific States Lumber Co. v. Bargar. 10 F. (2d) 335 (C. C. A. 9th, 1926) ;
Parker v. Holmes, 4 N. H. 97 (1827). Solly v. Forbes, 2 Brod. & B. 38, 129 Eng. Rep.
871 (C. P. 1820) is cited often as basis for the test of intent; but that case involved
a reservation of rights against the debtor, about which contract there can be no ques-
tion of intent.
19. For a full exposition of these lines of reasoning, see Rucker v. Robinson, 7
Whittelsey (38 Mo.) 154 (1866); Meredith v. Dibrell, 127 Tenn. 387, 155 S. W. 163
(1913). See REPORT OF N. Y. LAw REVISION CoMM. (1937) 909 et seq.
20. Morgan v. Smith, 70 N. Y. 537 (1877); Meredith v. Dibrell, 127 Tenn. 387,
155 S. W. 163 (1913).
21. Palmer v. Purdy, 83 N. Y. 144 (1880). See also Nichols v. Norris, 3 Barn. &
Ad. 41 (K. B. 1831).
22. The indicia of this type of a covenant not to sue have been the intentions of the
creditor; partial and not full satisfaction of the debt; and the reservation of the rights
against the surety or joint debtor. It is upon the question of intent that much emphasis
is placed. Pacific States Lumber Co. v. Bargar, 10 F. (2d) 335 (C. C. A. 9th, 1926).
See note 18 supra.
23. Barnett v. Conklin, 268 Fed. 177 (C. C. A. 8th, 1920) ; Security State Bank of
Strasburg v. Groen, 59 N. D. 431, 230 N. W. 298 (1930).
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a bar to a law action on the original claim, and the only remedy of the
covenantee was a cross action for damages on the agreement. 2 4 As the
creditor was not barred from an action against the debtor, the surety's rights
were held not to be changed so materially as to warrant a discharge. How-
ever, under modem contract doctrine, the validity of this contention is
destroyed. An executory accord can now be set up to enjoin any action
until the granted period of time has elapsed. If the agreement is a release
-in effect, a covenant never to sue -it may be set up as a complete bar
to an action by the creditor against the debtor.2 Because of this fundamental
change, the present use of the covenant not to sue rationale seems anachron-
istic, since it lends no substantial support to the proposition that the surety's
rights are not impaired by such an agreement.
The most serious objection to the rationale offered in support of the
reservation rule is that it ignores completely the principal's purpose in
entering into the transaction. Literally interpreted, the agreement unquali-
fiedly absolves the principal debtor from the performance of his former
obligations to the creditor; if the reservation has the effect of merely forcing
the creditor to send another collector after the principal, the value of the
particular agreement to the principal would to a large extent be destroyed. -G
In addition, the simple expedient of the reservation clause effectively nullifies
the rule which has been declared to be desirable, namely, that a surety is
discharged by any alteration in the original contract which varies his risk.27
The courts have manifested a surprising lack of insight by failing to
distinguish between the effect upon the surety of agreements granting ex-
tensions of time and of those providing for releases. In the latter case
direct action against the principal is precluded, and the result may well be
that the debtor will cease all efforts to fulfill his obligations, to the material
disadvantage of the surety. On the other hand, an extension of time may
often benefit the surety who would be called upon to perform the duty if
the debtor had not secured the stay.
Circularity and speciousness characterize the arguments offered to justify
the reservation rule. In the first place, it must be conceded that "the reser-
24. Rucker v. Robinson, 7 Whittelsey (38 Mo.) 154 (1866); Frazer v. Jordan, 8
El. & B1. 303, 120 Eng. Rep. 113 (Q. B. 1858).
25. A covenant of permanent forbearance, which enures as a release, has from early
times been set up as bar at law to avoid circuity of action. REsTATiXE T, Co.a-.Acrs
(1932) §405 (1). Line v. Nelson, 38 N. J. L. 358 (1876). A covenant not to sue for
a limited period of time and other executory accords have been held a good defense in
equity. RESTATE-&ENT, CorTRAcrs (1932) § 417(d). Very v. Levy, 13 How. 345 (U. S.
1851). A practical effect of these decisions has been to bar indirectly any action by the
creditor against the principal contrary to the covenant not to sue, particularly in code
states where a separate court of equity need not be appealed to.
26. Gustine v. The Union Bank of La., 10 Rob. 412 (La. 1845). An agreement vith
such a reservation is hardly more than a promise by the creditor not to take further action
until the surety obtains sufficient assets to fulfill the obligation. In the principal case,
the creditor did not attempt to enforce the judgment against the surety until the latter
wvas devised a life interest in two parcels of real estate. Plaintiff's Brief in Opposi-
tion to 'Motion to Certify Record in Gholson v. Savin, p. 7.
-27. ARA T, SURTYSHIP AND GUARANTy (1931) § 67.
19411 NOTES 1489
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
vation of rights against the surety can be valid only on the assumption that
the rights of the surety also are reserved."28 Most cases turn on the question
of whether the surety has a right of redress against the principal. But the
rights of the surety against the principal are reserved only if the reservation
of the creditor's rights against the surety is valid. Because of the resultant
circuity of logic, it is impossible to test either of these two propositions
by the other. There appears to be no case wherein the surety has been
denied an action against the principal after the creditor had succeeded against
the surety,29 and it is hardly conceivable that the surety could proceed
against the principal debtor by exoneration or by subrogation, if the creditor
had no action against the surety. To set up as the test of the validity of
the reservation the question of whether or not the surety may obtain redress
from the principal, as most cases do, is merely to beg the major question-
whether the reservation clause is a desirable modification of surety law.
The fallacy of discussing the creditor's rights against the surety in terms
of reimbursement of the surety by the principal is particularly apparent in
cases turning upon the doctrine of subrogation. Often it is stated that in
order for an action by the creditor against the surety to lie, there must be
a preservation of the right to enforce by way of subrogation the surety's
claim against the principal.30 Hence if the surety would have recourse to
subrogation after payment to the creditor, the creditor may pursue the surety.
But here again, the right of the surety to subrogation 3' depends on the power
of the creditor to take action against the surety; if the creditor succeeds,
the right of subrogation will exist. This argument, moreover, is mainly
academic, for even if subrogation in the name of the creditor or in the
name of the surety does not lie, the surety is able to secure reimbursement
from the debtor under the principles of indemnity3 2 which gives him an
action of assumpsit based on an express or implied contract with the principal
debtor.
28. 4 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (Rev. ed. 1936) § 1230 (criticism of reservation rule).
29. Cf. Spies v. Nat. City Bank, 174 N. Y. 222, 66 N. E. 736 (1903), nwtion for
reargument denied, 175 N. Y. 464, 67 N. E. 1090. In that case, a New York court re-
lieved a surety of all his obligations, even though the creditor had reserved his rights,
because under the law of Louisiana, where the principal resided, the surety could not
have secured redress.
30. Gholson v. Savin, 31 N. E. (2d) 858, 863, quoting 4 WILLISTON, CoNTA'rs
(Rev. ed. 1936) § 1230.
31. This right is available only after a full discharge of the obligation by one bound
by duty and not acting officiously. RESTATEMENT, RESTITUTION, § 162; see Mellette Far-
mers' Elevator Co. v. H. Poehler Co., 18 F. (2d) 430 (D. Minn. 1927).
32. For the distinction between subrogation and indemnity, see (1928) 16 GEo. L.
J. 485; RESrATZIENT, RESTITUTION, §§ 76 et seq., 162. See also 4 WILLISTON, CONTRAcTs
(Rev. ed. 1936) § 1275 for the surety's right to exoneration, allowing the surety to sue
upon maturity of the obligation to compel the debtor to fulfill his duties. An interesting
conceptual problem would be posed by an action for exoneration in face of a release
with a reservation. If an action by the creditor against the surety would lie, an exonera-
tion action by the surety could compel the principal to pay the creditor despite the pro-
visions of the release, which disclaims such direct liability.
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To bolster this circuitous reasoning, many courts have asserted that the
reservation manifests the intent of the contracting parties that, if action be
taken against the surety, he in turn should have redress against the princi-
pal.33 It is maintained that since the principal and the creditor have con-
tracted by implication to keep alive the latter's indirect recourse against the
principal, the intention to preserve the creditor's right of action against the
surety should not be defeated. The earlier decisions, however, found a pri-
mary intention of releasing the debt, and refused to recognize subsequent
provisions inconsistent with that intention ;34 it has not been until relatively
recent times that authorities have been able to find in the same words a
completely different intent 35 that the release or the extension of time be
subject to an action by the surety against the principal, either upon the
instigation of the creditor or upon the initiative of the surety." 1 But even
if the courts are able to ascertain the true intent of the parties such a test
is unsatisfactory. Unless the principal and the creditor may force upon the
surety material changes in the original contract, their intent can in no way
determine the liability of the surety.
An emerging principle that the surety will be discharged only by harmful
alterations might be extended to avoid discharge when the principal contracts
merely for extension of time, whether or not an explicit reservation is made.37
The result could be accomplished directly by a statute which provided that
the surety could not be wholly discharged by a change of the obligation
of the principal, except upon a release of the principal, but that in any
event he should be freed of liability to the extent to which he is prejudiced
by such changes. 38 When the reservation rule is applied to releases, how-
33. See note 18 supra.
34. See Price v. Barker, 4 El. & Bl. 760, 776, 777 (Q. B. 1855).
35. Id. at 777. Query: what wvas the actual intent of the debtor in the principal
case when he paid $2000 in return for a formal release filed in court?
36. Despite contradictory indicia of "intent of the contracting parties," the courts
have apparently not sought extrinsic evidence to prove it. See note 7 Vipra.
37. Wilkinson'v. McKimmie, 229 U. S. 590 (1913); Uniontown Bank v. Mackey.
140 U. S. 220 (1891) (sick surety not discharged); Nat. Park Bank Y. Koehler, 65
Misc. 390, 121 N.Y. Supp. 640 (Sup. CL 1909), aff'd, 137 App. Div. 785, 122 N. Y. Supp.
490 (1st Dep't 1910). The present trend is indicated by the fact that a compensated
surety must show that he is prejudiced by an extension of time agreement before he
is released. See e.g., Md. Casualty Co. v. Ohio River Gravel Co., 20 F. (2d) 514 (C.
C. A. 4th, 1927).
38. Cf. N. Y. SENATE INTRODUcTORY No. 66 and N. Y. AssFi s.. INrT0Dcroav
No. 108 (1938), proposed by the New York Law Revision Commission. N. Y. LAw RE-
visio.N Comm. (1938) 31. Although such legislation would render the reservation clause
superfluous, it would in effect be read into every agreement between the creditor and the
principal. The actual result of an extension of time to the principal under such a statute
would not vary considerably from the effect of a creditor's neglecting to take action
against the principal after the obligation has matured. At the present time, the surety is
not discharged by the willful failure or negligence of the creditor to pursue the surety,
or by a failure on the part of the creditor to inform the surety of an extension of time
agreement containing a reservation clause. Stetson v. First Nat. Bank, 44 S. W. |2d)
792 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931) ; cf. Pain v. Packard, 13 Johns. 174, 7 Am. Dec. 369 1N. Y.
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ever, the surety is more likely to be injured, for the creditor must bring
any action that he may start directly against the surety. Thus the affirmative
burden to take action against the principal is thrown entirely upon the surety.
A reservation of rights in an agreement to release the principal so substan-
tially increases the surety's burden as to reach an inequitable result, and
should be disregarded.
Despite the flimsy legal structure supporting the reservation clause, the
question of whether or not such a clause should be given effect when nego-
tiable paper is involved has been almost wholly foreclosed by the Negotiable
Instruments Law.39 As a result of statutory enactment of the reservation
rule, certainty in commercial transactions has to a large extent offset the
disturbing doctrinal objections to the rule. However, in other phases of
suretyship law not controlled by the Negotiable Instruments Law even
certainty is not assured. In those cases there seems to be no apparent
justification for the application of the reservation rule in agreements granting
discharges to the principal, regardless of its possible value as a qualification
of covenants not to sue for a definite period of time. The frailties in the
rationale supporting the reservation rule, together with a consideration of
the equities, may in the future force other courts to follow the lead of the
Ohio Supreme Court in refusing to give effect to the reservation clause in
a discharge of the principal debtor.
DENIAL OF COMPENSATION TO BONDHOLDERS' REPRE-
SENTATIVES SERVING CONFLICTING INTERESTS IN
CORPORATE REORGANIZATION*
IN corporate reorganizations the domination of bondholders' committees
and indenture trustees by conflicting interests has frequently resulted in a
virtual exclusion of bondholders from participation in the reorganization
proceedings and the post-bankruptcy control of the debtor.1 Chapter X of
the Chandler Act,2 designed to eliminate abuses of power by non-representa-
tive committee members, strengthens generally the position of independent
1816), noted in (1928) 37 YALE L. J. 971, under which doctrine a minority of states
hold the creditor to a duty of exercising diligence in proceeding against the principal,
after a special request for such action by the surety.
The courts might be allowed to determine the extent of the surety's damage fron
the extension of time and to reduce his liability proportionately. CARDozo, THE NATURE
OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1932) 153. To protect the principal debtor from indirect
attack, however, it will be necessary to grant to the surety, if he desires to invoke it, the
same immunity from action by the creditor as is given to the principal.
39. § 120.
*Woods v. City Nat. Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago, 61 Sup. Ct. 493 (U. S. 1941).
1. See REIs, FALSE SECURITY (1937) c. 9.
2. 52 STAT. 883 (1938), 11 U. S. C. §§ 501-676 (Supp. 1939). Subsequent citations
to Chapter X will refer to the section number alone.
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committees3 and the interests of unorganized bondholders. Courts operating
under Section 77B 4 of the Bankruptcy Act- predecessor of Chapter X -
had not followed, as a method of affording protection to bondholders, the
practice of denying compensation to committees and indenture trustees serving
conflicting interests. 5 Although it has been suggested that the contribution
of the insiders group to the interests of the depositing bondholders should
not be discounted, a policy of withholding compensation presents a possible
method of discouraging the formation of banker-management committees"
and thus encouraging bondholder representation through committees respon-
sible exclusively to the depositing security holders. For this reason the
Supreme Court in a recent case 7 adopted the inflexible rule of denying com-
pensation to creditors' representatives serving conflicting interests.
In the case decided, claims for compensation during proceedings under
Chapter X8 were filed against the debtor by an indenture trustee, the members
of a bondholders' committee, and the committee's counsel. The bondholders'
committee, originally organized by the indenture trustee,9 purportedly repre-
sented about half of the outstanding bonds. Its most active members included
employees of the indenture trustee's corporate reorganization department as
well as employees of an underwriter heavily interested in the debtor's stock
and under threat of suit for defrauding the bondholders. 10 The same firm of
3. Committees not affiliated with the underwriter or xith the indenture trustee are
more dependent upon compensation than committees which have the resources of a
financial organization at their call. In order to bolster the resources of unaffiliated com-
mittees, compensation allowances are more freely awarded under the Chandler Act than
previously. See §§ 241-43.
4. 48 STAT. 912, 11 U. S. C. § 207 (1934).
5. See In re Paramount Publix Corporation, 83 F. (2d) 406 (C. C. A. 2d, 1936);
Cromwell v. Curtis, 99 F. (2d) 810 (C. C. A. 2d, 1938) ; In re Milhmukee Lodge, 83
F. (2d) 662 (C. C. A. 7th, 1936).
6. See WNham, Chapter X of the Chandler Act (1939) 25 VA. L. Rev. 389, 397.
7. Woods v. City Nat. Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago, 61 Sup. Ct. 493 (U. S. 1941).
8. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals regarded the entire reorganization pro-
ceeding as having taken place under 77B. In re Granada Apartments, 111 F. (2d) 834
(C. C. A. 7th, 1936). The Supreme Court, however, and the District Court e.,plicitly
applied the provisions of Chapter X to the claims for compensation.
9. The committee was formed by the corporate reorganization department of the
indenture trustee before it had become officially connected with the debtor. In eight
years this department had formed 425 such bondholders' committees. The committee in
the instant case held only four formal meetings and wvas at all times controlled by the
indenture trustee. Counsel for the indenture trustee justified the trustee's formation of
the committee as an attempt to circumvent Illinois law which does not permit indenture
trustees to bid in debtors' property at judicial sales. See Chicago Title & Trust Co.
v. Robin, 361 Ill. 261, 198 N. E. 4 (1935). Through the committee the indenture
trustee could bid in the property and thus protect its depositors holding the debtor's se-
curities. Woods v. City Nat. Bank, 61 Sup. Ct. 493 (U.S. 1941), Respondents' Brief
on Petition for Rehearing, p. 5.
10. It was alleged that the underwriter had stated falsely in the prospectus of the
bond issue that certain furniture was covered by the mortgage which secured the issue.
Because the personnel of the committee interlocked with that of the underwriter, tht
committee might have been tempted not to press too strongly any fraud remedy it might
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attorneys retained by the indenture trustee were employed by the committee.
Thus the interlocking personnel of the committee and the indenture trustee
represented the depositing bondholders who were interested in having a low
upset price fixed for the debtor's property,1 the non-depositing bondholders
who were interested in a high upset price, and a large stockholder who sought
a favorable position in the reorganization at the expense of both. Finding
the claims for compensation void for "want of equity" the bankruptcy court
refused to allow any compensation out of the debtor's estate. The Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals overruled this decree,12 but was in turn reversed
by the Supreme Court. Adopting a strict rule in order to foreclose the
"tendency to evil" implicit in such cases, the Court held that a fiduciary"8
serving interests conflicting with those of his cestuis may receive reimburse-
ment for proper expenditures 1 4 but may not receive compensation for his
services regardless of his good faith.15
The decision of the principal case virtually overrules several decisions in
federal reorganizations under the clause of former Section 77B' 0-substantially
identical with the corresponding provision of Chapter X17 - authorizing the
court to confirm a plan if satisfied that, among other things, reorganization
expenses are "reasonable." In In re Paramount Publix Corporation,"8 for
example, the court awarded compensation to a committee dominated by an
underwriter who had retired from the proceedings under threat of a suit
for fraud without considering the issue of disallowing compensation because
have had. See Woods v. City Nat. Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago, 61 Sup. Ct. 493, 496
(U. S. 1941).
11. For a discussion of conflicts of interests arising between majority and minority
bondholders in reorganization proceedings, see Utter, Problems of Trustees under De-
faulted Bond Issues (1933) 56 TRuST COMPANIES 653, 656-57.
12. In re Granada Apartments, 111 F. (2d) 834 (C. C. A. 7th, 1940).
13. According to Mr. Rodgers the relationship between a bondholders' committee
and the depositing bondholders has been described as one of trust, agency, agency cou-
pled with an interest, syndicate, bailment, and assignment. "It is safe to say that the
relationship is contractual and that it is fiduciary, but a more accurate generalization is
impossible." See Rodgers, Rights and Duties of the Committee in Bondholders' Reor-
ganications (1929) 42 HARV. L. REv. 899, 928-29. Of course, these terms are labels for
legal consequences which result when they are used. As descriptive terms they are not
determinative of legal results in specific reorganization situations.
14. Expenditures for which the courts may order reimbursement must have been
actual money payments, must have been made "in furtherance of a project exclusively
devoted to the interests of those whom the claimant purported to represent," and must
"have clearly benefited the estate." Woods v. City Nat. Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago,
61 Sup. Ct. 493, 497-98 (U. S. 1941). It is probable in view of the attitude of the Supreme
Court that bankruptcy courts will not be allowed to award compensation tinder the label
of liberal expenditures.
15. The trustee's duty of strict loyalty, restated by Chief Judge Cardozo in Meln-
hard v. Salmon, 249 N. Y. 458, 164 N. E. 545 (1928), a case which dealt with the taking
up of real estate options by one member of a partnership, has academic support. See
RESTATEMENT, TRuSTS (1935) §§ 170 and 205 and RESTATEMENT, AGENCY (1933) §§ 389
and 399k.
16. 48 STAT. 920, 917, 11 U. S. C. §207c(9) (1934).
17. §221(4).
18. 83 F. (2d) 406 (C. C. A. 2d, 1936).
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the claimants had served conflicting interests. The same result was reached
in Cromwell v. Curtis"0 in which a bondholders' committee was formed by
the underwriters of the defaulted issue and served by counsel to the debtor.
Compensation was allowed to the committee under Section 77B although
the argument of conflicting interests was urged upon the court. In In re
Milwaukee Lodge,- moreover, compensation was allowed to a committee
employing the indenture trustee as depositary. In both the Paramount Publix
case and the Milwaukee Lodge case the courts felt that, provided the services
of the claimants were valuable, the claimants' affiliations with conflicting
interests did not forfeit their rights to compensation.21
At first blush the results in these cases seem to be supported by convincing
arguments. It may be contended, for example, that the presence of the
debtor's management and the debtor's investment bankers on a bondholders'
protective committee is advantageous to the interests of the bondholders. The
management of the debtor, if only to save its own reputation, is often inter-
ested in the future well-being of the corporation. The underwriters may
promote the rehabilitation of the debtor because they wish to regain the
good will of the customers to whom they have sold the debtor's defaulted
securities2 2 or because they feel a moral responsibility to further their cus-
tomers' interests. Since both have an intimate knowledge of the functional
and financial peculiarities of the debtor, their assistance can be valuable to
bondholders' committees, especially in those reorganizations in which the
independent trustee, having no recent connection with the debtor, is charged
with the duty of formulating the plan.2 3 Furthermore, it is difficult for the
ordinarily large number of small security holders to organize on their own
initiative. Unless, therefore, the underwriters and the debtors' management
assume the responsibility of representing them, they will not be represented
at all.
The arguments for the formation of banker-management committees, how-
ever, are not as convincing as they superficially seem. Under Chapter X
19. 99 F. (2d) 810 (C. C. A. 2d, 1938).
20. 83 F. (2d) 662 (C. C. A. 7th, 1936). The lower court, although later reversed,
had reasoned that no one in an adverse position to the debtor's stockholders may receive
compensation out of the debtor's estate. The doctrine of the lower court would, of course,
deprive all creditors' committees and indenture trustees of compensation for their ser-
vices regardless of whether they served conflicting interests or served their cestuis e,-
clusively. A somewhat similar argument was offered in the In re Radio Keith Orpheurm
case, (S. D. N. Y. 1940), unreported case cited in Israels, Some Problems of Policy
and Procedure in the Conduct of Rcorqaniation Proceedings (1940) 89 U. oF PA. L
REv. 63, 84, in which the largest security holder had proposed the reorganization plan
and had borne the burden of conducting the proceedings. It was urged by counsel, but
not accepted by the court, that he should not be compensated because he was merely
serving his own interests. But cf. In re Consolidation Coal Co., 14 F. Supp. 845 (D.
Md. 1936).
21. Compensation has been denied, however, when the fee claimant has committed
actual fraud. In re De Ran, 260 Fed. 732 (C. C. A. 6th, 1919).
22. N. Y. Lx. Doc. No. 66, 159th Sess. (1936) 2.
23. Under § 156 the appointment of a trustee is made mandatory if the liquidated.
non-contingent liability of the debtor is $250,000 ur more. Otherwise the appointment
is optional. Under §§ 167 and 169 the trustee is given the duty of preparing the plan.
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bondholders are not forced to choose, as under Section 77B, between
depositing their securities with a committee and being practically, if not
technically, excluded from the reorganization. If they do *not deposit their
securities with a committee they are represented by the indenture trustee,
whose powers have been effectively strengthened by the Chandler Act.2 4
The duty of preparing a plan of reorganization, moreover, devolves not upon
committees, but upon a court officer, the independent bankruptcy trustee. 25
Furthermore, under Chapter X neither the court nor the security holders
are dependent upon the banker-management group for information concern-
ing the debtor since the court can now call upon the Securities and Exchange
Commission for a report upon the feasibility and fairness of prospective
reorganization plans. 26 Committees formed by the banker-management group
will, moreover, be guided by the conflicting interests of two groups, the
banker-management sponsors of the committee and the depositing bondholders.
Equity has long insisted that a man cannot serve two masters,2 and ex-
perience with reorganizations conducted under Section 77B has shown that
where banker-management committees have been active the interests of the
depositing bondholders have very often been adversely affected. Bondholders'
protective committees serving conflicting interests28 have been frequently
interested, for example, in gaining compensation or in protecting only the
management of the debtor and the underwriters of its defaulted securities. 20
Underwriters and indenture trustees intimately connected with the financial
affairs of the debtor often appointed bondholders' committees composed of
their own employees even before the debtor's insolvency became imminent.
Aided by their exclusive possession of lists of the debtor's security holders, 8°
these committees usually solicited and obtained deposits of bonds before
groups of independent bondholders were able to organize. Counsel fees,
committee memberships, and other types of patronage were frequently awarded
24. Under § 126 the indenture trustee may file the original bankruptcy petition; under
§ 137 it may file a controverting answer to the original petition; under § 170 it may file
a reorganization plan if the debtor is continued in possession; and under § 198 it may
file claims in behalf of security holders under the trust indenture.
25. §§ 167, 169.
26. Under § 172 the court must, if the debtor's liabilities exceed $3,000,000, submit
such plans as it regards worthy of consideration to the S. E. C. for examination and
report. If the liabilities of the debtor. do not exceed $3,000,000, the court may submit
plans to the S. E. C. The recommendations of the S. E. C. are in either case, however,
not binding on the court.
27. See RFSTATEIENT, TRUSTS (1935) § 170; LORING, A TRUSTr'S HANDBOOK (5th
ed. 1940) § 18.
28. See REis, supra note 1, 162-63.
29. N. Y. LEG. Doc. No. 66, 159th Sess. (1936) 22; REPORT ON PROTECTIVE AND
REORGANIZATION Commi=snEs, Part I (S. E. C. 1937) 865 (hereinafter cited as S. E. C.
REP.).
30. Under § 77B the court was empowered to order the debtor or the indenture trus-
tee to make public their lists of the debtor's security holders. Complete lists of the
security holders of the larger debtors, however, are not often possessed by the debtor or
the indenture trustee. Those parts in the.possession of other members in the insiders'
group were therefore-, under § 77B, open only to the insiders committee. Under § 165
of Chapter X, however, the court is empowered to order the disclosure of lists of the
debtor's security holders in the hands of whomsoever they may be.
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to the debtor's management and to other parties previously connected with
the debtor to insure their co-operation.3' Such committees have been in a
position to conceal the previous negligence and fraud of the underwriters
and the management and to gain for the underwriters the flotation of the new
corporation's securities. They have sometimes worked also to secure senior
positions for the securities owned by the inside group, to maneuver their
employers into the post-reorganization management,32 and to obtain large
fees for themselves and their employers.3 3 Although the bondholders may
not be technically defrauded when their committees have adverse motives,
their interests are obviously endangered.34
The denial of compensation to creditors' representatives serving conflicting
interests may prove effective in keeping the debtor's management and the
security underwriters from taking part in Chapter X proceedings. In so far
as it does, independent groups of bondholders will be encouraged to form
their own committees. This influence will probably be most effective in cases
where a court trustee formulates the reorganization plan since prospects of
lucrative fees may be the dominant motive for the formation of banker-
management committees. But when a court trustee has not been appointed
the desire to secure the adoption of a plan which will allow the committees
to gain post-reorganization control of the debtor or to aid in its rehabilita-
tion may supplement the desire for compensation. The disbursement of fees
will still be necessary, however, to insure the internal unity of the insiders
group. The importance of the compensation motive is indicated, moreover,
by the practical non-existence of bondholders' committees in railroad reor-
ganizations, in which committee fees are not awarded.35 It is certain that
in so far as the allowance of fees to committees is conditional upon the
absence of conflicting interests, committees serving conflicting interests will
become increasingly fewer.
But even where the prospect of a denial of compensation alone is not
sufficient to discourage the formation of banker-management committees, other
powers are available to the court as a means of avoiding abuses. If, for
example, an underwriter or indenture trustee is willing to absorb the loss
of uncompensated time and labor for the possibility of gaining a favorable
position in the reorganized corporation, it may still masquerade as a repre-
sentative of the bondholders 5nd hinder their attempts at bona fide inde-
pendent organization. The bankruptcy court may, however, apply the pro-
31. S. E. C. REP., supra note 29, 872-73.
32. See Carey and -iggs, Reorganiationm-The Last Chance (1940) 34 ILL. L. REV.
549, 552.
33. S. E. C. REP., supra note 29, 866. Professional committee organizers not owning
any bonds but interested solely in compensation have occasionally taken part in pro-
tective committee formation. N. Y. LEG. Doc No. 66, 159th Sess. (1936) 22.
34. For a discussion of these abuses in railroad reorganizations, see Lowenthal, The
Railroad Reorganization Act (1933) 47 HARM. L. REv. 18; Douglas, Protctihe Commnit-
tees in Railroad Reorganization (1934) 47 I-uv. L. REv. 565.
35. Insurance companies, savings banks, and other institutional lenders, howvever,
have united for representation in railroad reorganizations. But their interests are differ-
ent from those of smaller investors. For example, institutional lenders often o,,-n se-
curities of more than one issue. See Israels, Some Problems of Policy and Procedure
in the Conduct of Reorganization Proceedings (1940) 89 U. OF PA. L. Rzv. 63, 82-83.
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vision of the Act which authorizes it, "if the acceptance or failure to accept
a plan by the holder of any claim or stock is not in good faith," to disqualify
such claim or stock for the purpose of determining the requisite majority
for the acceptance of a plan.36 As an additional remedial measure, moreover,
the power to appoint and remove members of bondholders' committees
whenever abuses develop may be implied from this section and from the
provisions of the Act 3 7 authorizing the bankruptcy court to require dis-
closure by creditors' representatives of their past connection with the debtor 0
and to disregard any provision of an instrument under which such representa-
tives purport to act, to enforce an accounting thereunder, and to restrain the
exercise of any power which it finds to be inconsistent with public policy.30
In applying these provisions, the district court is not limited to the powers
specifically enumerated. As courts of equity, the bankruptcy courts "are
guided by equitable doctrines and principles except in so far as they are
inconsistent with the act."' 40 Although bankruptcy courts possessed a some-
what similar scrutiny power under Section 77B, 4 1 they seldom used it to
investigate the qualifications of bondholders' representatives, 42 partially because
of the pressure of the volume of business before them. Under the Chandler
Act the responsibility of making the investigation will likely devolve upon
the court trustee. Where he is able and conscientious,'13 parties actively serving
conflicting interests will find it difficult to disguise themselves as bondholders'
representatives.
36. § 203.
37. §§211 and 212.
38. Under the Lea Bill, H. R. 6968, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1937), which was a
companion bill to Chapter X, committees formed by the management, the underwriter,
or their representatives, or by any other parties whose interests were likely to conflict
with those of their cestuis would not have been allowed to solicit the deposit of securi-
ties. The Lea Bill had the support of the S. E. C.
39. In In re Rosenbaum Grain Company the debtor made nominations for a cred-
itors' committee, but requested the court to appoint the committee. In complying with
the request, the court said, "It is.exceedingly important . .. that the court have its own
representatives on the stockholders' and creditors' committees . . . [and] control of the
committee and the right to remove any member who either through negligence or dis-
honesty fails to perform the duties of his office." 13 F. Supp. 600, 601 (N. D. Il. 1935).
Whether the court could have assumed the power to nominate a committee without the
debtor's request is, however, yet unsettled. Once a committee had been formed and
had obtained deposits, however, courts occasionally regulated their activities, even under
§ 77B. In In re Schroeder Hotel Conpany the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals af-
firmed the decision of the lower court restraining a committee guilty of fraud and mis-
representation from further communication with the creditors. 86 F. (2d) 491 (C. C. A.
7th, 1936). But cf. In re Fox Metropolitan Playhouses, Inc., 74 F. (2d) 722 (C. C. A.
2d, 1935).
40. S. E. C. v. U. S. Realty & Improvement Co., 310 U. S. 434, 455 (1939).
41. Section 77B(b) of the Bankruptcy Act, 48 STAT. 912, 11 U. S. C. §207b (1934).
42. See Fortas, The Securities Act and Corporate Reorganizations (1937) 4 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROB. 218, 229-30.
43. For an argument that the disinterested trustee and the S. E. C. may not be as
well equipped or as interested as the management of the debtor and its security under-
writers in furthering the interests of the bondholders, see Wham, Chapter X of the Chand-
ler Act (1939) 25 VA. L. REv. 389, 396-97.
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